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I. INTRODUCTION
Diversity is the new frontier in corporate governance literature.  There 
is widespread attention to the topic from legislators, regulatory agencies, 
activists, and the media lamenting the low levels of women’s representation
on corporate boards in countries with both a legal commitment to gender 
equality and a strong record of equality at a societal level.  Women hold 
less than 17% of the board positions in corporate America, and 
unsurprisingly, hard questions for this inequality of representation are
being asked in a milieu where corporations are acknowledged to have a 
greater purpose than short-term profit maximization.1  As the Supreme 
Court said in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
[although] a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money,
modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at 
the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.  For-profit corporations, 
with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not 
at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic 
objectives.2 
Corporations are paying attention, although it is unclear whether change
is driven by the threat of legislatively mandated quotas or the realization
that increasing the number of women on boards is good for the bottom
line.3  For instance, gender diversity on United Kingdom corporate boards has
increased at a dramatic rate following the publication of Lord Davies’
report4 and sustained media and political attention to the topic.5 
BoardWatch reports that as of December 2014, 23% of directors of FTSE 
100 companies are women, with the share of nonexecutive directors being
 1. Quick Take: Women on Boards, CATALYST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www. 
catalyst.org/knowledge/women-boards. 
2.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). 
3. Claer Barrett, Gender Quotas Feel Coercive but Appear To Work, FIN. TIMES
(May 15, 2014, 12:29 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aef9d9c4-d521-11e3-9187­
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3HebMIE3d. 
4. See  LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, WOMEN ON BOARDS (2011), https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-745-women­
on-boards.pdf.
5. See generally THE 30% CLUB, http://www.30percentclub.org (last visited Mar.
30, 2015) (reporting the progress of increased gender diversity in boardrooms in the United
Kingdom). 
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28.2%.6  Whereas there were twenty-one boards with no women directors
in February 2011, there is not even one such company today.7 Across the 
FTSE 250, 17.7% of directors are women, with over 20% being 
nonexecutives.8  This group went from 52.4% all-male boards to 9.6%.9 
Although the rhetoric in that country has consistently been around the 
need to access the female talent pool and how valuable it is for businesses 
to have more women on their boards, the pace of change since 2010 might
suggest an underlying fear about mandatory quotas.10  This is likely given 
the looming threat of legislation at the European Union level,11 pervasive
popular distrust in big business, and political interest in the topic
domestically.12 To be sure, legislatively mandated quotas have dramatically
altered the proportion of women on boards in a number of European
countries, most notably Norway and France.13  The European Union has
proposed a directive modelled, if not in letter then in spirit, on the 
Norwegian experience.14
 6. BoardWatch, PROF. BOARDS F. (Dec. 2014), http://boardsforum.co.uk/board 





 10. See Erika Watson, Quotas Aren’t the Best Way To Get More Women into
Boardrooms, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/  
commentisfree/2012/mar/18/quotas-women-boardroom-equality.
11. See  EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE,
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: COMMISSION WORK PROGRAMME 2012, at 2–3, 11 
(2011); EUROPEAN COMM’N, GREEN PAPER: THE EU CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK 7 (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-  
164_en.pdf; EUROPEAN COMM’N, STRATEGY FOR EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN
2010–2015, at 20 (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/strategy_equality
_women_men_en.pdf; EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN IN ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING IN
THE EU: PROGRESS REPORT 5 (2012) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN IN 
DECISION-MAKING], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_
en.pdf; Press Release, European Comm’n, European Union Justice Commissioner Reding
Challenges Business Leaders To Increase Women’s Presence on Corporate Boards with 
“Women on the Board Pledge for Europe” (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release, 
Women on the Board Pledge], http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-124_en.htm. 
12. Leo Cendrowicz, Can Mandatory Quotas Bring Gender Equality to Europe’s 
Boardrooms?  TIME (Mar. 8, 2012), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599, 
2108607,00.html. 
13. See Waving a Big Stick, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.economist. 
com/node/21549953. 
14. See Cendrowicz, supra note 12. 
 3


















   
 
 
      
 
   
    
      
 
  
   
 
    
  
On the contrary, in the United States, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has abjured quotas and has only required diversity
disclosure since 2010.15  Remarkably, the consultation process prior to the
adoption of the SEC rule witnessed responses from market actors
representing over $3 trillion in assets, and 90% of the letters indicated
dissatisfaction with the status quo and expressed support for disclosure of 
diversity information.16 In the years since, a senior SEC official has
confessed that the disclosure regime is not working effectively,17 noting 
that 
many . . . companies provided only abstract disclosure . . . a brief statement 
indicating that diversity was something considered as part of an informal policy.
[There was no] discussion of any concrete steps taken to give real meaning to its
efforts to create a diverse board. . . .  [T]hese companies fail to provide investors
with useful information, and it deprives investors of information they have
demanded.18 
Recent academic work confirms that companies are not complying with 
the requirements of the rule and that change has been slow.19  On the other
side of the globe, Australia offers an interesting case study. In the early 
stages of legislative intervention in other countries, Australia was cited as 
a positive example for a nonquota solution.20  However, recent evidence 
indicates that women’s representation on corporate boards has not kept 
pace and the existing legal scheme is neither precisely tailored to 
achieving its stated objectives nor enforced as written.21 
Cross-country studies show that legal mandates have been more potent
than voluntary initiatives.22  For instance, France has witnessed an 
increase in female board representation in its top 200 companies from 
7.2% ten years ago to about 30% today thanks to a quota law passed in 
15. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the Center
for Transatlantic Relations Conference on Global Perspectives on Women in the 
Boardroom: Diversity in the Boardroom Is Important and, Unfortunately, Still Rare (Sept. 
16, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch091610laa.htm. 
16. Id. 
17. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the Agenda
Luncheon Program: Board Diversity: Why It Matters and How To Improve It (Nov. 4, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110410laa.htm. 
18. Id.  For a similar comment in the Australian context, see BLACKROCK 
INVESTMENT MGMT. (AUSTL.) LTD., GLACIAL CHANGE IN DIVERSITY AT ASX 200
COMPANIES: CAN CORPORATE AUSTRALIA ESCAPE THE IMPOSITION OF DIVERSITY QUOTAS?
2–3 (2012). 
19. See Tamara S. Smallman, Note, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’s Role in
Cracking the Door Open so Women May Enter, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 804. 
20. See LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, supra note 4, at 13, 27. 
21. See BLACKROCK INVESTMENT MGMT. (AUSTL.) LTD., supra note 18, at 2–3, 5.
 22. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING, supra note 11, at 13. 
4
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2010.23  The corresponding data for Italy––which passed a quota law in 
2011––is even more incredible, rising from 1.8% in 2004 to almost 26%
at present.24  In contrast, the Australian rate of change has been described 
as “glacial.”25 Just 19.3% of the directors of Australian companies listed 
on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 are women, and thirty-
five ASX 200 companies do not have any women on the board.26  The 
figure for ASX 201–300 companies for 2012 was a mere 7.6%.27  Four 
years since the adoption of the ASX Guidelines, a study conducted by
KPMG for the ASX showed that “it is evident that many organisations 
still have a long way to go in terms of establishing clear and measurable 
objectives and working towards improving the number of women.”28  The
United States presents a similar picture with just 16.9% of board positions
being held by women in 2014.29  The ten-year rate of growth in women’s 
representation in the United States is a mere 5%—lagging behind 
corresponding figures in Europe by over 8%.30 
This evidence indicates that the existing regimes in the United States 
and Australia are ill suited to their objectives and are unlikely to yield a 
significant upward change in women’s representation on boards within a
reasonable timeframe.  Therefore, we posit a normative model for increasing 
women’s representation on corporate boards based upon a comparative 
study of several jurisdictions built upon shareholder empowerment.  We 
argue that the evidence indicates that voluntary models such as those 
pursued by the United States and Australia are designed to fail because of 
conceptual overdetermination, misalignment of incentives, and prohibitive 
enforcement costs.  The sole example of successful voluntary action––the
United Kingdom––can be explained by the looming shadow of mandatory
 23. Hugh Carnegy, Europe Leads the Way in the Number of Women on Top 
Company Boards, FIN. TIMES (June 5, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
6389d9e0-ebf5-11e3-ab1b00144feabdc0.html#axzz35p4vHJCv. 
24. Id.
 25. BLACKROCK INVESTMENT MGMT. (AUSTL.) LTD., supra note 18, at 2.
 26. Statistics, AUSTL. INST. COMPANY DIRECTORS, http://www.companydirectors.com.au/ 
Director-Resource-Centre/Governance-and-Director-Issues/Board-Diversity/Statistics (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
27. See Boardroom Diversity Index 2013, WOMEN ON BOARDS, http://www.women
onboards.org.au/pubs/bdi/2013/index.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
28. KPMG, ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON DIVERSITY 4 (2014), http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx­
compliance/kpmg-report-diversity-2014.pdf. 
29. Quick Take: Women on Boards, supra note 1.
 30. See Carnegy, supra note 23. 
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quotas. Amidst the pervasive lack of trust following the financial crisis 
of 2008 in the United Kingdom, the deep suspicion of European Union 
legislation mandating quotas seems to have pushed United Kingdom 
companies to advance the diversity agenda as a means of preempting
unwelcome regulatory attention.31 
Bereft of such a threat, existing approaches in the United States and 
Australia are not likely to yield similar numerical results or corporate 
governance advantages from a compliance focused model. Despite this 
reality, we do not propose mandatory quotas––at least not in corporate 
governance law––because gender quotas are ill suited to the core goals of
that instrument.  Instead, we employ agency theory and argue that–– 
congruent with the stated goals of corporate governance law to facilitate 
more effective monitoring of management by shareholders––the SEC 
diversity disclosure rules should make way for a law mandating a binding
shareholder vote on diversity. This vote should be held annually and give 
shareholders an opportunity to vote on whether the company ought to
consider diversity in board appointments, adopt a diversity policy, specify
diversity targets, and enforce such targets by internal mechanisms such as 
links to executive pay.  If––as the arguments advanced by proponents 
claim––board diversity is valuable to shareholders, such resolutions will 
be adopted and women’s representation will increase.  Moreover, our 
model is flexible and facilitates a market-based solution adaptable for 
variable types and levels of diversity based upon the individual needs of 
companies without imposing significant costs.  Therefore, for example, 
pursuant to a shareholder vote, cosmetics companies with products tailored 
to female consumers or high numbers of female employees might specify
a higher target than mining companies without such attributes.  We do not
claim that shareholder empowerment and better monitoring of management 
are the sole or even primary reasons for promoting board diversity.
Indeed, there are other powerful arguments for diversity, but these are not 
within the purview of corporate governance law.  Therefore, rather than
employing corporate disclosure as a blunt tool for the achievement of a 
sociopolitical goal, however worthy, our model is more modestly tailored 
to fit a specific governance goal: reducing agency costs by enabling better 
monitoring of management by shareholders.  This preserves space for
other kinds of legislation, if permissible under the constitution, to achieve
gender equality. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: Part III provides 
an overview of the chief arguments advanced by the scholarly literature 
for board diversity.  Part IV sketches legislative developments in a number
 31. See Barrett, supra note 3.
6
GOPALAN FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2018 3:05 PM      
  
















   
  
  
     
   






[VOL. 52:  1, 2015] Corporate Board Diversity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
of countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and
the European Union where a variety of legal approaches have been
adopted to increase female representation on corporate boards.  Part V 
outlines our proposal for a binding shareholder vote on diversity, and Part 
VI concludes. 
II. THE CASE FOR GENDER DIVERSITY
There is a growing literature contributing to the debate on women’s
representation on corporate boards.32  Aside from theoretical work, an 
increasing volume of empirical scholarship seeks to identify the
relationship between greater female representation and various aspects of
firm performance, monitoring, and sustainability.33  The case for gender 
diversity can be constructed from this literature and grouped under the 
categories below. 
A. Diversity and Firm Performance 
The most often repeated raison d’etre for increasing board diversity–– 
at least as iterated by politicians and regulators––is that it makes a positive
contribution to firm performance.34  To put it simply, diversity is good for
the bottom line, and by their inattention to this issue businesses are not
maximizing shareholder value.35  This vein of argument relies upon
empirical studies reporting a positive correlation between firm 
performance and board diversity.36  A variety of methods for evaluating
 32. See, e.g., LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, supra note 4. 
33. See, e.g., Why Women Are Good for Business, WOMEN ON BOARDS (Dec. 2011),
http://www.womenonboards.org.au/pubs/articles/1112-why-women-are-good-for-business.htm. 
34. See, e.g., LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, supra note 4, at 7.
 35. See id.
 36. See ANNU KOTIRANTA ET AL., FINNISH BUS. & POLICY FORUM EVA, FEMALE 
LEADERSHIP AND FIRM PROFITABILITY (2007), http://www.europeanpwn.net/files/eva_ 
analysis_english.pdf; MIJINTJE LÜCKERATH-ROVERS, ERASMUS INST. OF MONITORING &
COMPLIANCE, THE DUTCH ‘FEMALE BOARD INDEX’ 2010 (2010), http://www.tias.edu/ 
docs/default-source/Kennisartikelen/femaleboardindex2010.pdf?sfvrsn=12; Press Release,
Thomson Reuters, Average Stock Price of Gender Diverse Corporate Boards Outperform
Those with No Women (July 10, 2013), http://thomsonreuters.com/press-releases/ 
072013/Average-Stock-Price-of-Gender-Diverse-Corporate-Boards-Outperform-Those-with­
No-Women; Shivali Nayak, More Women in the Boardroom Can Improve Profitability: 
Pros, CNBC (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:24 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46034361; Renuka 
Rayasam, Do More Women on the Board Mean Better Results?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 19, 
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the potential effects of increased female boardroom presence are evident 
in the literature with some scholars employing the “natural experiment”
provided by the implementation of Norwegian quota legislation.
The most high-profile reports, from Catalyst, assert that companies with
more female board members have a 53% higher return on equity, a 42% 
higher return on sales, and a 66% higher return on invested capital.37 
These figures are based on a univariate analysis that ranked U.S. Fortune 
500 companies by boardroom gender diversity and then compared the 
means of the highest and lowest quartiles with no attempt to control for 
other variables.38  There are obvious risks with such a method, especially
the failure to control for other variables or consider causation.  One of the 
earliest empirical studies––by David Carter, Betty Simkins, and W. Gary
Simpson––showed that the positive relationship between diversity and 
Tobin’s Q was significant even when controlled for firm size and other 
factors.39  Similarly, Ronald Anderson and others report that a 10%
increase in board heterogeneity leads to a 7.49% increase in industry
adjusted Tobin’s Q with current board diversity predictive of future firm
performance. 40 This result includes consideration of both social diversity 
––age, ethnicity, and gender––and experiential diversity––education and 
employment background––but finds that each affects Tobin’s Q to some
extent.41  These findings are applicable to firms with complex operations; 
Anderson hypothesizes that there are costs of managing diversity and
these costs are outweighed by benefits in the case of complex operations 
but not in the case of firms with simple operations.42 
Conversely, in a study of gender diversity on the boards of Swedish
companies, Sven-Olov Daunfeldt and Niklas Rudholm argued that gender 
diversity has a negative effect on return on total assets after a time lag of 
two years.43  Using longitudinal data between 1997 and 2005, the study
showed that there is no relationship between female board members and 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/do-more-women-on-the-board-mean­
better-results; Why Women Are Good for Business, supra note 33. 
37. LOIS JOY ET AL., CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS (2007), http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/ 
The_Bottom_Line_Corporate_Performance_and_Womens_Representation_on_Boards.pdf.
38. Id.
39. David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 
FIN. REV. 33, 33, 36 (2003). 
40. Ronald C. Anderson et al., The Economics of Director Heterogeneity, 40 FIN.
MGMT. 5, 6 (2011). 
41. Id. at 5–6. 
42. Id. at 9. 
43. See Sven-Olov Daunfeldt & Niklas Rudholm, Does Gender Diversity in the 
Boardroom Improve Firm Performance? 4 (Scandinavian Working Papers in Econ., HUI 
Working Paper No. 60, 2012), http://swopec.hhs.se/huiwps/abs/huiwps0060.htm. 
8
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firm performance at the time of appointment but that there is a statistically
significant difference––at 10%––from two years after appointment.44 
However, their study does not evaluate potential reasons for the considerable
heterogeneity on how more gender-balanced boards influence firm 
performance.45  Further, there is no information as to what occurs after the
third year, and so assertions as to decreasing value cannot really be 
substantiated from the results.  Another study that sought to analyze 
the impact of board diversity on firm performance showed a negative 
relationship.46  Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira’s study covered 85,000
U.S. directors and sought to identify the relationship between board
diversity and governance by looking at board inputs such as attendance 
records and governance functions such as CEO oversight.47  They found 
that women have a better attendance record than men and that men attend 
meetings more regularly in gender diverse boards.48  However, only 
2.38% of their observations involved board members meeting the SEC’s 
75% threshold of meetings not attended,49 and therefore the results might 
be capable of alternative explanations.  Further, gender-diverse boards 
were more likely to see CEO turnover when the firm performed poorly.50 
After a one standard deviation fall in stock price, the probability of CEO 
turnover was found to be 9.87%, but in firms where the board was at least
40% female, this probability increased by 25.1%.51  This may indicate that 
women are stronger monitors and more likely to hold CEOs accountable 
for performance.52  Adams and Ferreira also found that firms with greater 
board gender diversity have lower Tobin’s Q and return on assets and 
suggested that this may be due to overmonitoring by the board.53  Adams 
and Ferreira therefore suggest that diversity might add value for companies 
that do not have strong monitoring of management.54  Other studies have 
suggested a positive relationship between board diversity and more 
44. See id. at 8, 20. 
45. See id. at 17–18. 
46. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact 
on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291 (2009). 
47. See id. at 293–95. 
48. Id. at 292. 
49. Id. at 296. 
50. See id. at 301. 
51. Id.
 52. See id.
 53. Id. at 308 tbl.11. 
54. Id.
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control over CEO pay by disrupting the selection of board members likely 
to support high pay.55 
Several articles have reported on the effect of board diversity on firm
performance using the natural experiment provided by Norway’s quota 
legislation. Øyvind Bøhren and Øystein Strøm considered all of the 
nonfinancial firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange between 1989 and 2002 
and found that firms with less gender diversity create more value.56 
However, this study took place when females made up approximately 3% 
of directors, and even the authors note that the number of women in the 
sample they studied was so small that the results may not hold for a 40% 
quota situation.57  From a study of 248 publically listed companies,
Kenneth Ahern and Amy Dittmar suggest that the implementation of the 
Norwegian quota led to firms increasing in size, undertaking more
acquisitions, increasing leverage, and reducing cash holdings.58  They  
argue that a compulsory 10% increase of female board members is
associated with a 12.4% decline in Tobin’s Q from the average.59 This 
analysis is based on a finding that those firms that already had at least one
female board member when the quota was announced in 2002 had 2007 
Q values that were 0.26 higher––in the context of an average Q of 1.53–– 
than firms that had no female board members in 2002.60  This was based 
on the assumption that the greater increase in female participation
represents a greater constraint on the firm’s choices, and there was no 
control for the alternative possibility that firms with a longer history of 
gender diversity may experience long-term positive effects.61  Ahern and 
Dittmar observed that firms with no women on their board lost about 3.5% 
of their value in the days immediately following the unanticipated 2002 
announcement of quotas and used this as “evidence that the quota imposed
significant and costly constraints on Norwegian firms.”62  Of course, 
market reaction cannot accurately measure the costs of a novel future 
change; the most a measurement of reaction can actually evidence is the
 55. See James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board 
Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 79 
(1995).
56. Øyvind Bøhren & Øystein Strøm, Governance and Politics: Regulating
Independence and Diversity in the Board Room, 37 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1281, 1291, 1297 
(2010).
57. See id. at 1298. 
58. Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact 
of Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 137, 139, 
141 (2012).
59. Id. at 140. 
60. Id. at 147–49, 160. 
61. See id. at 160–68. 
62. Id. at 159–60. 
10
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opinion of a portion of the market regarding the predicted effect of the 
measures announced.  Matsa and Miller further extrapolate that female 
directors increase overall costs because “they are more altruistic and long­
term–oriented than male directors.”63  In their research, Matsa and Miller 
persistently compare characteristics of new females with those of retained
males,64 ignoring the more relevant issue of difference between new
female directors and the men they replaced.  Further, as noted within the 
Ahern & Dittmar article, the study of a natural experiment such as 
Norway’s implementation of quotas provides rich data but does not allow 
separate consideration of age, gender, and experience on firm value.65 
Cathrine Seierstad and Tore Opsahl’s consideration of the Norwegian 
quota implementation found an increase in women holding multiple board 
positions,66 suggesting that quota law merely offered more opportunities 
to a small number of women without having wider impact on women’s 
opportunities.  However, the focus on a small number of prolific “golden 
skirts”––women who hold positions on several boards––is rarely explained 
in the broader context.67  Although 15% of female directors in Norway
hold two or three positions and 2% hold more than four positions, the 
same can be said of 10% and 1% of male directors, respectively,
remembering that the absolute number of male directors remains higher 
than female directors.68 Considering the financial effects of female 
directors in the Norwegian context, Bøhren and Siv Staubo note that the 
negative financial effects observed were mostly limited to firms with low
agency costs, which require less monitoring and more advice.69  They  
argue that the effects were the result of a dramatic increase in independent
 63. Id. at 142 (quoting David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in 
Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., July 2013, 
at 136, 138). 
64. Id. (citing Masta & Amalia, supra note 63.)
65. Id. at 188. 
66. Cathrine Seierstad & Tore Opsahl, For the Few Not the Many? The Effects of 
Affirmative Action on Presence, Prominence, and Social Capital of Women Directors in
Norway, 27 SCANDINAVIAN J. MGMT. 44, 51–52 (2011). 
67. See id.
 68. EVA TUTCHELL & JOHN EDMONDS, MADE IN NORWAY: HOW NORWEGIANS HAVE
USED QUOTAS TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WOMEN ON COMPANY BOARDS 28 (2013),
http://fabianwomensnetwork.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/made_in_norway_web.pdf. 
69. Øyvind Bøhren & Siv Staubo, Mandatory Gender Balance and Board Independence, 
21 EUR. FIN. MGMT. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 21), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2543871. 
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directors, the unintended side effect of quota legislation.70  In other 
research studying those firms that avoided the quota legislation by 
changing company form, Bøhren and Staubo also found that firms with 
strong ownership and low agency costs were more likely to take action to
avoid the costs of implementing the quota.71  Even in a natural experiment 
setting, it is very difficult to determine a specific generalizable link 
between female board members and firm profit.
In addition to the difficulty of separating specific board characteristics,
there are various other theoretical difficulties in judging board behavior
by firm financial outcomes such as endogeneity and the difficulty in
obtaining reliable information from within the “black box” of board
behavior.72  Adams, Benjamin Hermalin, and Michael Weisbach note the
impossibility of overcoming endogeneity problems using the example of 
board size.73  Observing that the larger of two boards was associated with 
weaker financial performance, it would be tempting, they suggest, to 
conclude that larger boards weaken financial performance.74  However,  
without understanding the reasons why each board chose the size and 
structure, it is not possible to say whether board A would improve its 
financial performance by emulating board B.75  Ultimately, pure statistics 
are unable to fully interrogate the unobserved variations between boards, 
firms, cultures, and contexts.  In addition, the empirical literature is 
bedevilled by problems of reverse causation. 
A study of actual board processes would be helpful instead of merely
comparing input and outcome because it would overcome some of the 
theoretical limitations.  Miriam Schwartz-Ziv’s work provides an opportunity
to appraise the actual processes by which male and female directors may
affect board performance and, through this, firm performance.  Schwartz-
Ziv had access to detailed minutes of 402 board meetings from eleven
Israeli government corporations.76  Coding the activities recorded, she
found that boards with a critical mass––three or more––of each gender 
70. Id. at 26–27. 
71. See Øyvind Bøhren & Siv Staubo, Does Mandatory Gender Balance Work?
Changing Organizational Form To Avoid Board Upheaval, 28 J. CORP. FIN. 152, 154 
(2014).
72. See Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate 
Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 86
(2010).
73. See id. at 59–60. 
74. See id. at 60.
 75. See id. at 60–61. 
76. Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Does the Gender of Directors Matter? 12 (Harv. Univ. 
Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 8, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257867. 
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were more active.77  Where critical mass existed in a given meeting, the
board was more likely to take initiative or request further information.78 
Schwartz-Ziv argues that this behavioral finding gives weight to an 
argument that there is a causal link between gender diversity on boards 
and firm performance.79 It is the absence of a convincing causal explanation 
that weakens much of the literature seeking to measure the relationship 
between female board members and firm performance.
An emerging area of scholarship is investigating the relationship 
between board diversity and company performance in areas other than 
short-term shareholder wealth maximization.  For instance, one study 
found there is no relationship between the number of women on the board 
and the company’s responsiveness to climate change.80  A study of 200 
Australian firms listed on the ASX found that increased representation of
women was “positively linked with both economic growth and social 
responsiveness” but had “a non-significant relationship with environmental 
quality.”81 
Despite the extensive focus on the assertion that additional female 
board members will create financial returns, the evidence is equivocal and
the theoretical basis is shaky.82  The economic argument will invariably
run into discussion of concerns about social justice.  As Diane Brady
comments, “[i]t’s not good enough for a diverse board to be as good as 
77. Id. at 7. 
78. Id.
 79. Id.
 80. Jeremy Galbreath, Corporate Governance Practices That Address Climate 
Change: An Exploratory Study, 19 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 335, 346 (2010). 
81. Jeremy Galbreath, Are There Gender-Related Influences on Corporate
Sustainability? A Study of Women on Boards of Directors, 17 J. MGMT. & ORG. 17, 29 
(2011).
82. Some researchers argue there is a positive link between gender diversity and
firm performance. See e.g., NANCY M. CARTER & HARVEY M. WAGNER, CATALYST, THE
BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS
(2004–2008), at 2 (2011), http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/the_bottom_line_corporate
_performance_and_women%27s_representation_on_boards_%282004-2008%29.pdf; Anderson
et al., supra note 40, at 6; David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, 
and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 36 (2003).  Some argue that there is a negative link. See, 
e.g., Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 58, at 140; Bøhren & Strøm, supra note 56, at 1284; 
Daunfeldt & Rudholm, supra note 43, at 4; Yi Wang & Bob Clift, Is There a “Business 
Case” for Board Diversity?, 21 PAC. ACCT. REV. 88, 90 (2009); Lu Zhang, Board 
Demographic Diversity, Independence, and Corporate Social Performance, 12 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 686, 696 (2012).  Others argue that there is a context-specific link. See, e.g., 
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46, at 301. 
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one that’s only men.  Those girls have to take your company to new levels 
of excellence to prove it’s worth the headache of bringing them on.”83 
And yet, as discussed above, women remain a small minority so “their
individual contributions must be quite significant to be detected in studies 
of board performance.”84  One suggested discursive solution is, noting that 
there is no clear evidence that women affect firm performance, either for 
good or for evil, it must be left to the business community to provide proof 
as to why women would damage a firm if they seek to maintain gender­
homogenous boards.85 
Ultimately, even if the “business case”86 were capable of unequivocal
proof, and even if such proof existed, the result would only serve to create
one way in which firm value could be increased.  Firms would have the 
responsibility of considering whether this mode of creating value was 
equal or superior to other modes, and women would thus be competing in 
a marketplace of value addition.
B. Talent Pool
Advocates for gender diversity have pointed to disproportionate 
representation on the board as evidence of poor utilization of the available
talent pool composed of both sexes.  This argument claims that the 
underutilization of a particular group––females––logically implies a 
decreased quality of board appointments.  The talent pool argument was 
one of the six most common justifications for gender diversity on boards 
amongst directors interviewed by Lissa Broome and others87 and was also 
noted by scholars such as Zena Burgess and Phyllis Tharenou.88  However,
given that the argument essentially requires evidence of a suboptimal level 
of quality in board appointments, it is generally not compelling at an 
individual firm level, especially because women are entitled to pursue 
board positions and firms have clear incentives to appoint the most 
qualified candidate regardless of sex. Further, there are likely to be less 
83. Diane Brady, The Crumbling Case Against Women on U.S. Boards, BUS. WK.
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/195389-the-crumbling­
case-against-women-on-u-dot-s-dot-boards. 
84. Beate Elstad & Gro Ladegard, Women on Corporate Boards: Key Influencers 
or Tokens?, 16 J. MGMT. GOVERNANCE 595, 596 (2012). 
85. See Barbara Black, Stalled: Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, 37 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 7, 20 (2011). 
86. Id.
 87. See Lissa L. Broome et al., Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate 
Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 764 (2011). 
88. Zena Burgess & Phyllis Tharenou, Women Board Directors: Characteristics of 
the Few, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 39, 40 (2002). 
14
GOPALAN FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2018 3:05 PM      
  



















       
 
 





       
[VOL. 52:  1, 2015] Corporate Board Diversity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
intrusive options such as additional training and development of existing 
appointees. 
The talent pool argument may have more power when mobilized at a 
national level. For example, a McKinsey Report notes “a failure to recruit
and retain able women . . . exacerbate[s] the acute talent shortage,”
lamenting that the lack of women in senior positions is “a huge waste of 
talent . . . .  that Asian companies can ill afford.”89 The European Union’s
factsheet Women on Boards–The Economic Arguments also makes this
argument, specifically referencing the fact that 60% of university
graduates in Europe are women.90  Similarly, United Kingdom Prime 
Minister David Cameron argued the drive for more women in business “is
not simply about equal opportunity, it’s about effectiveness. . . .  [I]f we 
fail to unlock the potential of women in the labour market, . . . we’re 
failing our whole economy.”91 In the Australian context, the Grattan 
Institute suggests that a 6% increase in female workforce participation 
would lead to a $25 billion increase in Australian gross domestic
product,92 which is certainly an incentive to encourage full utilization of
the talent pool at all levels. The talent pool argument is unlikely to provide 
motivation for individual firms to increase gender diversity on their 
boards but may provide a catalyst for legislative action at a national level.
C. Attribute-Based Justifications 
Some arguments for increased female presence on corporate boards 
refer specifically to attributes that are perceived to be more common in
women than in men.  Drawing upon evidence of differences between men
and women at a behavioral level, this strand of argument for diversity
relies upon studies showing that women are more participative and 
democratic in their decisionmaking, more concerned with the welfare of
 89. CLAUDIA SÜSSMUTH-DYCKERHOFF ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., WOMEN MATTER:
AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE: HARNESSING FEMALE TALENT TO RAISE CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE 1 (2012), http://www.mckinsey.com/global_locations/asia/~/media/mckinsey
%20offices/japan/pdf/women_matter_an_asian_perspective.ashx. 
90. EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN ON BOARDS–FACTSHEET 1: THE ECONOMIC 
ARGUMENTS 1 (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/fact
sheet-general-1_en.pdf.
91. David Cameron Won’t Rule Out Women in Boardrooms Quotas, BBC NEWS, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-16958852 (last updated Feb. 9, 2012, 6:47 AM). 
92. JOHN DALEY, GRATTAN INST., REPORT NO. 2012-5, GAME CHANGERS: ECONOMIC 
REFORM PRIORITIES FOR AUSTRALIA 39 (2012). 
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others, more sensitive, and more cooperative.  For instance, Burgess and
Tharenou note that women are considered to have a positive “influence 
on decision making and leadership styles,” and play a role in “ensuring 
‘better’ boardroom behavior.”93  Under this umbrella, attributes like
communicativeness, detailed focus,94 risk aversion,95 and intensive monitoring 
are likely to translate into ideal qualities for a board member in some
contexts. 
Some scholarship suggests that women are comparatively risk averse.
For example Douglas Branson notes that “[w]omen are thought to be more 
sensitive and adverse to the sorts of risk that led to the global financial
meltdown of 2008.”96 This “women could have saved the world”
assertion features in numerous articles and is supported by research
showing that women are less risk prone in certain situations.97  For  
example, an interesting trend noted in the Cesce Group Report is that
companies with more than 40% women on their boards take on less credit 
than companies with a lower representation of women directors when
compared with the whole business community.98  Similarly, a research 
study of hedge funds showed risk appetite on the trading floor resulted in 
women performing 56% better than men in the period of 2000 to 2009, 
and in the height of the global financial crisis in 2008, men lost twice as 
much as women.99  Conversely, a Deutsche Bundesbank study in 2012
suggests an increase in the number of female board members will lead to
an increase in firm risk-taking behavior.100 This study suffered from some
issues regarding generalizability, for example, there were only twenty-
eight discrete instances of increased female board share out of nearly 
20,000 bank-year observations.101  Furthermore, no consideration was 
given to the possibility that the existing directors might have changed their 
93.  Burgess & Tharenou, supra note 88, at 40 (citations omitted).
94. Martha C. White, Even One Woman on the Board Makes a Difference, NBC
NEWS, (Jul. 21, 2014, 4:58 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/even­
one-woman-board-makes-difference-n158846. 
95. Judy F. Graham et al., Gender Differences in Investment Strategies: An 
Information Processing Perspective, 20 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 17, 17–18 (2002). 
96. Douglas M. Branson, An Australian Perspective on a Global Phenomenon:
Initiatives To Place Women on Corporate Boards of Directors, 27 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 2, 4 
(2012).
97. See, e.g., Irene van Staveren, The Lehman Sisters Hypothesis, 38 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 995, 999 (2014). 
98. María Pilar García Guijarro & Ana Calvo Abril, Spain, in BREAKING THE GLASS
CEILING: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM 98, 98–99 (Paul Hastings ed., 3d ed. 2013),
http://www.paulhastings.com/genderparity/pdf/Gender_Parity_Report.pdf. 
99.  Van Staveren, supra note 97, at 999. 
100. ALLEN N. BERGER ET AL., DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK NO. 03/2012, DISCUSSION 
PAPER: EXECUTIVE BOARD COMPOSITION AND BANK RISK TAKING 26 (2012). 
101. See id. at 6, 16. 
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own risk appetite in the presence of females––or younger directors or
Ph.D. holders.102  There is empirical literature suggesting that men often 
alter their behavior in the presence of women.103  Van Staveren refers to a
study of online chess players that considered 1,400,000 games of 15,000 
players and found that male players choose more aggressive strategies 
when playing against female players.104  This is the case even when such
a strategy reduces the man’s chances of winning.105  In fact, the increase 
in aggression is most pronounced when the man is objectively—according 
to chess ranking—less skilled than the female player.106 In addition to the
lack of clarity over whether females take greater or lesser risks, there is
no certainty over whether risk is a positive or negative trait.107  This would
likely depend on the industry and context.
Many of the arguments for increasing the number of women on boards
relate to the perception that women are better at problem solving and more 
able to engage in constructive dissent.108  Robert McCord of the proxy
advisory firm Glass Lewis LLC claimed that “[w]omen are more likely to 
ask tough questions, get detailed answers and push for collaborative 
solutions.”109  Indeed, Schwartz-Ziv was able to go within the black box 
and discover that there are specific differences between male and female
boardroom behaviors.  Schwartz-Ziv found that boards with critical mass
of female directors are more likely to take action––by making a decision
or asking for further information––and more likely to experience CEO 
turnover as a response to weak performance.110  Schwartz-Ziv also
showed some causality to the relationship between female directors and 
firm performance.111  The issue of tough questions relates to the
monitoring function of the board, which has been found to be positive or 
negative depending on the governance style of the particular firm.  Adams 
and Ferreira found that overmonitoring was responsible for a reduction in
 102. See id. at 39. 
103.  Van Staveren, supra note 97, at 998–99, 1010. 
104. Id. at 1000 n.2, 1001. 
105. Id. at 1000 n.2. 
106. Id. at 1001. 
107. See id.
108. Broome et al., supra note 87, at 764. 
109. Branson, supra note 96, at 18 (citing Kris B. Mamula, Pa. Treasurer Robert 
McCord Advances Issue of Women on Corporate Boards, PITT. BUS. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2011,
2011 WLNR 6860521).
110. Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 76, at 7, 22. 
111. See id. at 22. 
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firm value after increase in female board participation.112  Similarly,  
Bøhren and Staubo found that firm value responses to Norway’s quota 
legislation were likely to be the result of an increase in independent 
directors.113  Just as in the example of risk appetite, even if there was a
specific link between female directors and monitoring style, ideal 
monitoring style varies greatly between firms.
Even where certain feminine traits are considered to be advantageous
to board performance, simply adding women to a corporation’s board is 
not necessarily the solution.  Yvonne Billing and Mats Alvesson argue 
that, rather than implementing a simple “add women” formula,
characteristics perceived as “feminine” should be considered as a way to 
expand our understanding of management and leadership.114  Further 
complicating the use of feminine characteristics as an argument to appoint 
more female directors, studies have shown that the female advantage in 
these areas can be artificially replicated.  For example, one measurable
difference between male and female stress response is the female
tendency to increase beneficial production of oxytocin, which enhances 
cooperation.115  However, men receiving a nasal spray of oxytocin also 
increased their cooperative approach.116  If the core motivation for
pursuing gender diversity on boards were to be the specific female traits
that could be accessed, this might be achieved by oxytocin delivered to 
male board members.  Although such a suggestion appears flippant, it 
does highlight a weakness in reliance on business case arguments: there
is always an alternative business case.  Moreover, the gender attribute line 
of argument stereotypes women and conflates group attributes with
individual level capabilities. Women who reach board positions may not 
necessarily possess these attributes and may indeed lack them because of
habituation in male-specific traits.  Equally, men might share some of 
these qualities or acquire them by socialization.  Further, even if all
women could be uniformly asserted to have these traits, the traits may not
be actively utilized in board activity.117 
112. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 46, at 304–05. 
113.  Bøhren & Staubo, supra note 71, at 165. 
114. See Yvonne Due Billing & Mats Alvesson, Questioning the Notion of Feminine
Leadership: A Critical Perspective on the Gender Labelling of Leadership, 7 GENDER,
WORK AND ORG. 144, 144 (2000). 
115.  Van Staveren, supra note 97, at 1003–04. 
116. Id. at 1004. 
117. See Billing & Alvesson, supra note 114, at 148. 
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D. Trust and Signaling
In theory, the board exists to minimize the information asymmetries 
between shareholders and management and to exercise oversight over the 
latter in order to ensure they do not divert corporate resources to their own 
ends. Therefore, the board is saddled with legal duties to act in good faith 
and to work for the success of the company as a whole. Specific legal
provisions impose obligations on directors to be long-term oriented in 
their thinking, pay due regard to the interests of the firm’s employees and 
its business reputation, and consider stakeholders––business partners,
consumers, local communities where they operate––and the physical
environment.  These are supplemented by a general duty to act fairly in 
balancing conflicts between the various stakeholder interests as are likely 
to occur frequently with a recognition that shareholder interests are 
primary.118 
The effective discharge of these obligations requires trust from both 
shareholders and other key constituencies including employees and
consumers.  The levels of gender disparity currently observed on corporate 
boards in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia are unlikely to be conducive to the generation of such trust in a 
milieu where over 50% of the labor market and higher educated population 
is comprised of women.119  Therefore, unsurprisingly, a frequently advanced
argument for increasing the number of women on boards is the signal to 
employees, shareholders, stakeholders, and the market as a whole that the
board is worthy of trust.120 
Directors interviewed by Broome list signaling among the top reasons 
for board diversity,121 as do Burgess and Tharenou.122  There are also
suggestions that “a diverse board helps the organization to attract and
 118. See James M. Tobin, The Squeeze on Directors—Inside Is Out, 49 BUS. LAW. 
1707, 1709 (1994). 
119. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ENHANCING WOMEN’S ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN OECD
COUNTRIES 40–41 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/gender/Enhancing%20Women%20Economic 
%20Empowerment_Fin_1_Oct_2014.pdf. 
120. Board Brief: Why Gender Diversity Matters, TEX. WALL ST. WOMEN,
http://www.txwsw.com/pdf/board_brief.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
121. Broome et al., supra note 87, at 762–64; see Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly
D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
431, 431 (2008) (noting that the “signaling theory” figured most prominently in interviews 
regarding rationales for board diversity). 
122. See Burgess & Tharenou, supra note 88, at 40. 
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retain diverse talents.”123  Research shows that diversity is a signal to the
community that the company places a high value on women.124 
A signal is a clearly identifiable behavior that serves to denote the 
existence of a less observable, more amorphous behavior or characteristic.125 
Signals are most effective when they are cheap to send for those
possessing the characteristic and expensive for those not possessing the 
characteristic.126  Patrick Shin and Mitu Gulati use the example of working 
long hours, which operates as a signal attempting to denote the underlying 
characteristic of being a hardworking individual.127  Signaling behavior
can serve to indicate either differentiation or group identity.128  In  the  
present instance, board diversity may operate as a separation signal—our
company is different because we care about social justice issues––or an
identification signal––our company is part of the group that cares about 
social justice issues.  Shin and Gulati claim that diversity is a vague notion
and better understood as showcasing, given the context in which there are 
extremely limited instances of true diversity and an intention to show 
diversity may be valued and considered sufficient.129  The difficulty is that
even the showcasing signal might be dismissed if it is too cheap to send 
and false signalers cannot be punished.  Notably, at least one director
interviewed by Broome dismissed the prospect of board diversity as “a 
meaningless public relations maneuver” indicating the cheap value of the 
signal.130 
E. Summary 
The case for diversity transcends a direct contribution to firm profits. 
Even when empirical studies show an association between corporate
gender diversity and improved firm performance, the causal relationship 
is not entirely clear.  Some of the most persuasive evidence about the 
ability of diverse boards to improve firm performance concerns the role 
of the board in monitoring management.  This evidence suggests that 
123. Muhammad Ali et al., Board Age and Gender Diversity: A Test of Competing 
Linear and Curvilinear Predictions, 125 J. BUS. ETHICS 497, 499 (2014) (citation omitted). 
124. See Stephen Bear et al., The Impact of Board Diversity and Gender Composition
on Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Reputation, 97 J. BUS. ETHICS 207, 207 
(2010); Amy J. Hillman et al., Organizational Predictors of Women on Corporate Boards, 
50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 941, 944 (2007). 
125. See Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 
1022–23 (2011).
126. Id. at 1023. 
127. Id.
 128. Id. at 1022–23. 
129. See id. at 1038. 
130. Broome et al., supra note 87, at 764. 
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boards with a critical mass of female directors perform better at monitoring 
and holding CEOs accountable; this insight is central to the key aims of
corporate governance law.  Therefore, our proposal is closely tied to 
optimizing the monitoring function and thereby reducing agency costs. 
III. COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES
This section offers an overview of diversity initiatives in five countries 
and the European Union. These exhibit a variety of normative goals and 
are not always characterized by consistency between goals and solution 
design. While the Norwegian legislation appears to be motivated by talent
pool considerations, the European Union’s proposed directive is animated
both by social justice and economic arguments.  The United Kingdom
approach is supportive of diversity with the actual steps being left to 
businesses.
Regardless of normative consistency and clarity, quotas are a growing 
trend. A number of countries have implemented some form of gender 
quota for corporate boards in recent years, including Belgium,131 France,132
 131. See Loi modifiant la loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de certaines 
enterprises publiques économiques, le Code des sociétés et la loi du 19 avril 2002 relative 
à la rationalisation du fonctionnement et de la gestion de la Loterie Nationale afin de
garantir la présence des femmes dans le conseil d’administration des enterprises publiques 
autonomes, des sociétés cotées et de la Loterie Nationale [Law Modifying the Law of 
March 21, 1991 Reforming Certain Public Economic Enterprises, the Belgian Company
Code and the Act of April 19, 2002 on the Rationalization of the Function and
Management of a National Lottery to Ensure the Presence of Women on the Board of 
Autonomous Public Enterprises, Listed Companies, and the National Lottery] of June 16, 
2011, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Sept. 14, 2011, 2d. ed., 
http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/53/0211/53K0211012.pdf. 
132. See Loi 2011–103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des 
femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité
professionnelle [Law 2011–103 of January 27, 2011 on the Balanced Representation of Men
and Women on Boards of Directors and Supervisory and Professional Equality], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 28, 2011,
p. 1680, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/ta/ ta0592.pdf. 
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Iceland,133 India,134 Italy,135 Malaysia,136 Netherlands,137 Slovenia,138 
Spain,139 and the United Arab Emirates.140 An even greater number of 
countries have implemented quotas that are only applicable to state-
owned enterprises, some of which predate the Norwegian legislation.141 
In addition, various countries are currently considering proposals to
implement quotas for nongovernment companies, such as Brazil, Canada, 
Germany, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland.142  Other countries 
have employed recommendations in their corporate governance codes 
rather than legislation to advance diversity, including Albania,143 Austria,144
 133. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, EXCHANGE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON GENDER EQUALITY
3 (2012), ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/exchange_of_good_practice_no/is_ 
comments_paper_no_2012_en.pdf. 
134. See The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India), 
http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/182013.pdf. 
135. See Legge 12 luglio 2011, n.120, in G.U. July 28, 2011, n. 174 (It.), http://www. 
giustizia.lazio.it/appello.it/pari_opp/120.pdf. 
136. See Mazwin Nik Anis, PM: 30% of Corporate Decision-Makers Must Be 
Women, STAR, http://www.thestar.com.my/story/?file=%2f2011%2f6%2f27%2fnation%2
f20110627131533&sec=nation (last updated June 27, 2011, 3:43 PM). 
137. See Wet van 6 juni 2011 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek
in verband met de aanpassing van regels over bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten
vennootschappen [Act of June 6, 2011 To Amend Book 2 of the Civil Code in Connection 
with the Adjustment to Rules on Management and Control in Public and Private 
Companies], Stb. 2011 (Neth.), www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/viqscpzp
6bnu/f=y.pdf. 
138. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING, supra note 11, at 19. 
139. See Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality Between
Women and Men (B.O.E. 2007, 71) (Spain). 
140. See Sara Hamdan, U.A.E. Promotes Women in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/world/middleeast/uae-requires­
women-board-members.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print. 
141. See, e.g., KONSTANTINA DAVAKI, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE POLICY ON
GENDER EQUALITY IN GREECE 9 (2013); Tomer Maharshak & Roy Wiesner, Israel, in
BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 98, at 118–19. 
142. See Michelle Yetter, Canada, in BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: WOMEN IN THE
BOARDROOM, supra note 98, at 20–21.  The newly elected German coalition government
has agreed to implement a 30% quota on supervisory boards with draft legislation currently
with various ministries for comment. See, e.g., Saskia MacLaughlin, Update on Women’s 
Quota on Supervisory Boards, DLA PIPER (June 24, 2014), http://blogs.dlapiper.com/
employmentgermany/2014/06/24/update-on-womens-quota-on-supervisory-boards/. 
143. See Elda Dollija & Manjola Çollaku, Women and Glass Ceiling in Albania, 4
MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 720, 722 (2013). 
144. See AUSTRIAN WORKING GRP. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AUSTRIAN CODE 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33–34 (2012), http://www.wienerborse.at/corporate/pdf/ 
CG%20Codex%202012_v5_englisch.pdf. 
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Bangladesh,145 Jordan,146 Luxembourg,147 Malawi,148 Pakistan,149 
Singapore,150 and Trinidad and Tobago.151  Australia,152 Denmark,153 and 
Sweden154 each have a “comply or explain” model, which requires targets
for gender equity and reporting.  An overview of the key pieces of
legislation follows. 
A. Norway 
Norway is the pioneer of board gender quotas.155  There, corporate
gender diversity legislation must be understood with reference to the
broader social contexts of a strong, state-based family welfare provision 
and gender equality.156  The country has employed quotas to improve
 145. See TASKFORCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE CODE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR BANGLADESH 49 (2004), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code.pdf.
146. See COMPANIES CONTROL DEP’T, JORDANIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4 
(n.d.), https://www.sdc.com.jo/english/images/stories/pdf/corporateguidee.pdf.
 147. See BOURSE DE LUXEMBOURG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE X PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE LUXEMBOURG STOCK EXCHANGE 14 (3 ed. rev. 2013), 
http://www.kpmg.com/lu/en/topics/auditcommittee/documents/10principlesofcorporateg
overnanceofluxembourgstockexchange-2013.pdf. 
148. See  MALAWI  INST. OF DIRS., CODE OF BEST PRACTICE FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN MALAWI 17 (2010), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/malawi_codeii 
_1jun2010_en.pdf. 
149. See  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OF PAK., CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 
(2012), http://www.secp.gov.pk/CG/CodeOfCorporateGovernance_2012.pdf. 
150. See  MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., Code of Corporate Governance 6 (2012), 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/fin_development/corporate_governance/CGCR
evisedCodeofCorporateGovernance3May2012.pdf. 
151. See CARIBBEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INST. ET AL., TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 2013, at 13 (2013), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/
trinidad_tobago_cgcode_26nov2013_en.pdf. 
152. See ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (3d ed. 2014), http://www.asx.com.au/documents/
asx-compliance/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-3rd-edn.pdf.
 153. See DENMARK COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11 (2010), http://corporategovernance.dk/file/291826/
committee_recommendations_april_2010.pdf. 
154. See DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 27 (3d ed. 
2013), http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/files/2013/05/women_boardroom.pdf. 
155. AAGOTH STORVIK & MARI TEIGEN, WOMEN ON BOARD: THE NORWEGIAN
EXPERIENCE 3 (2010), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf. 
156. Siri A. Terjesen et al., Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: Institutional 






































gender equity in other fields, for example the Gender Equality Act of 1981 
required at least 40% of each gender on publicly appointed boards,
councils, and committees.157  Despite this history, the introduction of board 
quotas in 2002 came as a surprise––even the then minister of Trade and 
Industry described the announcement as “terrorist tactics.”158 
The genesis for the quota came from proposals put forward in October 
1999 by Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, Minister for Gender Equality under 
the Kjell Bondevik government, to amend the Gender Equality Act of 
1978 to extend quotas applicable to government companies to privately 
owned companies.159  Over time, these changes were transferred to the
Companies Act, and legislation was passed in 2003 after Bondevik returned 
to power following a period in opposition.160  Despite political support for
the proposal, the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry
(Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, NHO) considered the proposal
“unnecessary, because voluntary efforts are already being made to increase 
the recruitment of women to company boards.”161  In its final form, the
legal scheme allowed the business community an opportunity to enhance
gender diversity with mandatory quotas taking effect if voluntary efforts 
did not bear fruit.
The Norwegian legislation was likely motivated by a social justice 
mission in addition to the talent pool argument.  For instance, the then 
State Secretary in Norway’s Ministry for Children and Equality, Kjell 
Erik Øie, in a speech to the Economic Commission for Europe in 2007 
explained that
[w]e also see this as an important factor in the creation of wealth in society.  [It]
will secure women’s influence in decision making processes of great importance
for the economy. . . .  Women of today are highly educated and we need their
competence in all spheres and sector in the labour market.162 
ext=.pdf; see generally Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 
6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 67–68 (2010) (asserting that in Norway, striving for gender 
equality in the public and private sectors involves an adequate welfare system and good
governance in boardrooms). 
157. Alice Lee, Gender Quotas Worked in Norway. Why Not Here?, NEW REPUBLIC
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119343/impact-quotas-corporate­
gender-equality. 
158. Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 58, at 155. 
159. STORVIK & TEIGEN, supra note 155, at 7.
 160. See id. at 6.
 161. Kristine Nergaard, Government Proposes Gender Quotas on Company Boards, 
EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2003/06/feature/no0306106f.htm (last
updated June 25, 2003). 
162. Kjell Erik Øie, State Sec’y, Ministry for Children and Equal., Nor., Keynote 
Speech at The Economics of Gender Session of the Economic Commission for Europe, 
60th Anniversary Session: Gender Equality: A Key Component of a Modern Growth 
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Similarly, the then Minister for Children, Equality, and Social Inclusion,
Audun Lysbakken, claimed that “gender equality [is] a prerequisite and 
key factor for economic growth. . . .  If we neglect the need to empower 
women; [w]e pay for that neglect by weakening our countr[y’s] economic 
performance.”163  This focus is also reflected in comments made by 
drafters of the relevant legislation.164  The fact sheet published by the
Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries on the legislation
begins with the paragraph, “In Norway, a high number of women are 
employed.  Three out of five students in universities and colleges are 
women.  However, over the past years, the number of women on company 
boards has remained relatively small.”165 
Norway’s quota provisions were inserted into Chapter 6 of the Companies
Act, which covers company management.166  This chapter already 
included sections requiring that at least half of all directors on any board 
were residents of Norway167 and sections dealing with employee
representatives.168  In this context, the gender parity requirement is on
similar lines. Section 6–11a is the operative provision for a public limited
liability board: 
(1) On the board of directors of public limited liability companies, both 
sexes shall be represented in the following manner:
1. 	 If the board of directors has two or three members, 
both sexes shall be represented. 
Strategy (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.norway-geneva.org/ARKIV/gender270407/#.VE 
75X4vF8U4.
163.  Audun Lysbakken, Ministry of Children, Equal., and Soc. Inclusion, Speech to
the Global Roundtable on Board Diversity: An overview of the Gender Quotation on
Company Boards in Norway (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/ 
Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/bld-2/taler-og-artikler/2010/global-roundtable-on-board­
diversity.html?id=599588. 
164. See Rosenblum, supra note 156, at 66 n.59 (reporting on an interview with Aud 
Slettemoen, counsel at the Ministry of Justice and drafter of Norway’s corporate board 
quota).
165. Fact Sheet: The Legislation on Representation of Both Sexes in Boards, 
NORWAY MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUS., AND FISHERIES, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ 
nfd/press-centre/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-the-legislation-on-representa.html?regj_oss=1&id=641 
431 (last updated Sept. 19, 2011). 
166. See Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, June 13, 1997, § 6­
11a. 
167. Id. § 6-11. 
168. Id. §§ 6-4, 6-5.
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2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each
sex shall be represented by at least two members.
3. 	 If the board of directors has six to eight members, each
sex shall be represented by at least three members.
4. 	 If the board of directors has nine members, each sex 
shall be represented by at least four members, and if
the board of directors has more members, each sex 
shall be represented by at least 40 percent of the 
members of the board.169 
The quota shall not apply where there is less than 20% of either gender in 
the company’s workforce.170  These amendments to the Companies Act 
were added on December 19, 2003, but companies were given until the 
end of 2005 to make voluntary arrangements.171  When these efforts were
not satisfactory, the law entered into force on January 1, 2006, with a 
requirement that the mandatory quotas be achieved by 2008.172  Compliance
appears to have been high in the ensuing years with only seventy-seven
companies out of about 450 being in breach on January 2008.173  These
companies received warning letters from the Brønnøysund Registration
Centre, which gave them four weeks to comply.174  In February 2008, only 
twelve companies required a second letter, and by April 2008, all were 
compliant.175  It is noteworthy that the quota provisions were backed by a
dissolution sanction in the Companies Act, and this threat appears to have
aided compliance.176 Remarkably, in the ensuing years the Norwegian 
business landscape appears to have overcome initial opposition to the 
quotas,177 and there is now widespread support.178
 169. Id. § 6-11a. 
170. Id.  (“The first paragraph does not apply to . . . directors who have been elected 
among the employees pursuant to § 6-4 or § 6-37 first paragraph.  When two or more . . . 
directors as mentioned in the first paragraph are elected, both sexes shall be represented.
The same applies to deputy directors. . . .  [T]he second and third sentence[s] do not apply
if one of the sexes is represented by less than 20 percent of the total number of employees




STORVIK & TEIGEN, supra note 155, at 5.
Id.
 173. Id. at 9. 
174. Id.
 175. Id.
 176. Id. at 8–9. 
177. See, e.g., Jabeen Bhatti, The Quota Wars, ATLANTIC TIMES, http://www.the­
&catid=25%3Apolitics&Itemid=2 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
178. See TUTCHELL & EDMONDS, supra note 68, at 39. 
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B. The European Union 
Fewer than 18% of the board positions on 610 of the largest public 
companies in twenty-eight member states in the European Union are held
by women.179  Although the numbers are a poor reflection of gender
equality, it is noteworthy that they have risen from 8.5% in early 2003 to
17.8% in October 2013––more than double in just a decade.180  A mere
3% of these companies have women as CEOs.181  The largest percentage
growth has been witnessed in countries where legislation has been
introduced or considered in a milieu of public attention to the topic.182 
Against this record of low representation and political unease, the 
European Union proposed a directive for a procedural quota for board 
appointments on November 14, 2012.183 The proposed directive would
require any company that does not have a minimum of 40% of each sex
on its board of directors by 2020 to provide details of their appointment
process.184  A year later, on November 20, 2013, the European Parliament
voted to adopt the law, and it is now before the Council of the European 
Union.185 
The impetus for the proposed directive appears to have been provided 
by a call from European Commission Vice President Viviane Reding for 
listed corporations to sign the “Women on Board Pledge”—voluntarily 
committing to increase women’s presence on their boards to 30% by 2015 
and 40% by 2020.186  Companies were to make this commitment by 
179. EUROPEAN COMM’N, GENDER BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS: EUROPE IS 
CRACKING THE GLASS CEILING 1 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/ 
documents/140303_factsheet_wob_en.pdf. 
Proposes 40% Objective (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, 40% Objective],
 180. Id. at 2. 
181. See id.
 182. See id. at 3.
 183. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Women on Boards: Commission 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1205_en.pdf. 
184. See id.  Specifically, the directive requires 40% of nonexecutive directors to be
members of the underrepresented sex.  Id.
 185. See European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 20 November 2013 on the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Improving the 
Gender Balance Among Non-Executive Directors of Companies Listed on Stock 
Exchanges and Related Measures, COM (2012) 614 final (Nov. 20, 2013) [hereinafter 
European Parliament Legislative Resolution], http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get 
Doc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0488&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0340. 
186. See Press Release, Women on the Board Pledge, supra note 11. 
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International Women’s Day on March 8, 2012,187 with the threat that “if
self-regulation fails, I am prepared to take further action at EU level.”188 
Predictably, a mere twenty-four corporations signed the pledge in 2012, 
and the representation of women on European boards had only increased
marginally from 11.8% to 13.7%.189  Reding was not satisfied with the
results190 and proposed a directive establishing a quota for member 
states.191 
The European Commission then initiated consultation, claiming that
“[t]he lack of women in top jobs in the business world harms Europe’s
competitiveness and hampers economic growth.”192  Six national parliaments,
including the United Kingdom, made submissions to the European 
Commission noting that the proposed measures did not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity and that member states should be free and
responsible to initiate programs of reform.193  In total, 485 replies were
received––161 were from individual and 324 were from organizations, 
including 13 member states, 3 regional governments, 6 cities or municipalities,
79 companies, 56 business associations, and 53 nongovernment organizations 
––when the consultation period ended on May 28, 2012.194  The
arguments for women on boards varies, but there was strong and frequent
mention of the economic potential of the women who are qualified to take 
on more senior board roles: “t[t]his underused pool of qualified workers 
represents an untapped potential for the economy.” 195
 187. Id.
188. Press Release, European Comm’n, EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding
Meets European Business Leaders To Push for More Women in Boardrooms (Mar. 1,
2011) [hereinafter Press Release, Reding Push for More Women], http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-11-242_en.htm
189. EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING, supra note 11, at 15. 
190. Press Release, European Comm’n, European Commission Weighs Options To
Break the ‘Glass Ceiling’ For Women on Company Boards (Mar. 5, 2012), [hereinafter
Press Release, European Commission Weighs Options], http://europa.eu/rapid/press­
release_IP-12-213_en.pdf.
191.  Press Release, 40% Objective, supra note 183. 
192.  Press Release, European Commission Weighs Options, supra note 190. 
193. See Consultation on Gender Imbalance in Corporate Boards in the EU, EUR.
COMMISSION (May 28, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/opinion/
120528_en.htm; Gov’t Equals. Office, Dep’t for Bus. Innovation, & Skills, UK Response
to the European Commission Consultation on Gender Imbalance in Corporate Boards in 
the EU, EUR. UNION (May 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/
opinion/files/120528/pa/298_en.pdf. 
194. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Improving the Gender Balance Among Non-Executive Directors of Companies Listed on
Stock Exchanges and Related Measures, at 7, COM (2012) 614 final (Nov. 14, 2012)
[hereinafter Proposal for a Directive], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0614&from=EN. 
195.  Press Release, Reding Push for More Women, supra note 188. 
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Article 157(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) is the source of power for the proposed directive.196  Previous
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decisions interpreting this 
article held that where there is an opaque pay structure and a statistical
inequality between the sexes can be demonstrated, the burden of proof
shifts to the employer to prove that there is a nondiscriminatory reason for
the statistical inequality.197  Although not explicitly stated within the 
proposed directive, this argument seems to be doing much of the work. 
The process of appointment is opaque and not open to scrutiny, yet the 
data demonstrates a clear practical discrepancy between the number of
men and women on boards.  Notably, case law places limits on the positive 
discrimination that can be applied; it can only be effective to give priority
to equally qualified female candidates over male candidates.198  Therefore,
the Norwegian model would not be permissible because it would require 
the appointment of a less qualified female despite the availability of a
more qualified male.199 
The directive in the form adopted by the European Union Parliament is
designed to “ensure a more balanced representation of men and women”
in appointments to nonexecutive director positions of listed companies 
“by establishing effective measures aimed at accelerated progress towards
gender balance while allowing companies sufficient time to make the 
necessary arrangements.”200  It applies to listed companies, which are 
defined as companies with a seat “in a Member State and whose securities 
196. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 157(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 ).J. (c 326) 47 (“The European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting 
the Economic and Social Committee, shal adopt measues to ensure the application of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of
employment and occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work
of equal value.”). 
197. See Case 109/88, Union of Commercial & Clerical Emps., Den. v. Danish 
Emp’rs’ Ass’n ex rel. Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3200, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.
jsf?text=&docid=96004&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=116499. 
198. See Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. I-5562, http:// 
curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=45065&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mo
de=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=431310. 
199. See Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. I-6383, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=43455&pageIndex=0&doclang=E
N&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=83670. 
200. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 185, at art. 1. 
 29


























      







are admitted to trading on a regulated market within the meaning of Article
4(1)(14) of Directive 2004/39/EC, in one or more Member States.”201  The
directive excludes small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—firms
that “employ fewer than 250 persons and which have either an annual 
turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, or an annual balance sheet total
not exceeding 43 million euro”202—from its scope of application.203  Article 
4(1) provides the meat of the directive, stating, 
Member States shall ensure that listed companies in whose boards members of 
the under-represented sex hold less than 40 per cent of the non-executive director
positions adjust their recruitment, including vacancy announcements calling for
applications, pre-selection, selection and appointment procedures in such a way
that they effectively contribute to the attainment of the said percentage at the
latest by 1 January 2020 or at the latest by 1 January 2018 in the case of public 
undertakings.204 
Further, companies are required to select the most qualified candidates
from a gender-balanced selection pool and “on the basis of a comparative
analysis of the qualifications of each candidate, by applying pre-established,
clear, neutrally formulated and unambiguous criteria.”205  If board 
appointments are elected, companies have to “guarantee gender diversity
in the composition of the shortlist of candidates.”206  The objective in all 
cases is to achieve a representation of at least 40%.207 
Article 4(1) also contains the operative provision and states that 
“Member States shall ensure that . . . priority is given to the candidate of
the under-represented sex” ceteris paribus “unless an objective assessment, 
taking account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates, tilts the 
balance in favour of the candidate of the other sex.”208  This last portion 
is capacious and seems to leave interpretive latitude to a selection committee 
to choose a board member who is not from the underrepresented sex. 
There is some check on illegitimate activities by the duty to disclose. 
Member states have to ensure that listed companies disclose, if unsuccessful 
candidates so request, at least the number and gender of the candidates in
the selection pool, “the qualification criteria upon which the selection or 
appointment was based, the objective comparative assessment of those 
201. Id. at art. 2(1).
202. EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE NEW SME DEFINITION: USER GUIDE AND MODEL





European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 185, at recital 18. 
Id. at art. 4(1).
Id. at recital 22.
 206. 
207. 
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criteria and, where relevant, the considerations tilting the balance in
favour of a candidate of the other sex.”209 
Article 4(5) reverses the burden of proof when an unsuccessful
candidate is able to establish facts from which it may be presumed that 
she was as qualified as the successful member from the opposite sex.210 
In such cases, the company has the burden of proving that it did not act in
breach of article 4(1).211  This provision is meant to set a minimum standard, 
and nothing prevents member states from enacting measures that may be
more favorable to complainants.  Article 4(6a) imposes a requirement on 
listed companies to inform their shareholders about the directive’s
provisions and sanctions for noncompliance.212 
Article 5 requires companies to make commitments at the individual
level about achieving gender balance in respect of executive directorships.213 
Article 5(2) imposes annual reporting obligations on companies to divulge 
gender representation with details about executive and nonexecutive 
positions and steps taken to achieve the objectives of Article 4(1).214  This
information is to be reported in an easily accessible manner on the company’s
website and in its annual reports.215  When the objectives or commitments
are not met, the company has to disclose its reasons and any steps it
intends to take in the future.216  Enforcement of the directive is left to the
member states who are required to stipulate “rules on sanctions applicable
to infringements of the requirements for an open and transparent 
procedure . . . [and] take all necessary measures to ensure that they are 
applied.”217  These sanctions “must be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive and shall at least include” fines, judicially ordered nullification
or annulment of appointments that are in breach, exclusion from public 
calls or tenders, and partial exclusion from the award of funding from the 
European Union’s Structural Funds.218 Member states are allowed to 
pursue other actions that are broader than those in the directive as long as 
they “do not create unjustified gender discrimination or any other form of 
31
209.  Id. at art. 4(4). 
210.  Id. at art. 4(5). 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. at art. 4(6a). 
213.  Id. at art. 5. 
214.  Id. at art. 5(2). 
215.  Id. 
216.  Id. at art. 5(3). 
217.  Id. at art. 6(1). 
218.  Id. at art. 6(2), recital 30. 




   
 
























discrimination or hinder the proper functioning of the internal market.”219 
The directive is to be implemented by the passage of national law within 
two years of the European Union adopting the directive.220 The
procedural requirements in Articles 4(1), (3), (4), and (5) may be 
suspended by member states that had adopted laws prior to the directive 
as long as it can be shown that those laws enable the accomplishment of
the 40% representation goal.221  This suspension is to be automatically 
lifted if insufficient progress is made on the diversity front.222 The
directive deems it to be insufficient progress “if the percentage of the 
under-represented sex is lower than 30% by 2017 or by 2015 in the case 
of public undertakings.”223  Member states have to submit implementation 
reports to the European Commission by 2017 and every two years
thereafter.224  In turn, the European Commission is required to submit an
evaluation report based on the Member states’ reports by 2021 and every
two years thereafter.225  The European Commission is also required to 
express a view on extension of the directive’s temporal scope and need 
for extension to nonlisted companies and executive directorships of listed
companies.226  The directive has a sunset clause and is scheduled to expire
in 2028.227 
The European Parliament adopted the proposed resolution on gender 
diversity on November 20, 2013, with a vote of 459 in favor to 148
against, with 81 abstentions.228  In order to become binding, the directive
must also be endorsed by the Council of Ministers and, as a directive, 
passed into national law of each member state.229  Several countries,
including Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Czech
Republic have indicated that they intend to block the directive.230 
However, there has been significant change in the German approach to 
quota legislation since the September 2013 elections, and the country’s 
219. Id. at art. 7.
 220.  Proposal for a Directive, supra note 194, at art. 8(1). 
221.  Id. at art. 8(3). 
222.  European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 185, at art. 8(3). 
223.  Id. 
 224.  Proposal for a Directive, supra note 194, at art. 9(1). 
225.  Id. at art. 9(3). 
226.  European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 185, at art. 9(4). 
227.  Id. at recital 39. 
228. Press Release, European Parliament, 40% of Seats on Company Boards for 
Women (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/
20131118ipr25532/html/40-of-seats-on-company-boards-for-women; Directive. 
229. Id.
 230. E.g., Newsletters Get Women on Board–Issue No. 3, GET WOMEN ON BOARD, 
http://get-women-on-board.eu/en/ct/8-newsletters-get-women-on-board—issue-%233 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
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opposition to the directive is likely to falter.231  The directive is at the stage
of first reading in the Council of the European Union,232 and after two 
debates, the Council has not been able to “reach a general approach on the
directive.233  The directive requires the support of a double majority of
members in order to pass into European law.234  After the first reading on 
December 9, 2013, the Council has yet to take a first reading position.235 
In a speech after the directive passed the European Parliament, Reding 
referenced a social justice based justification for diversity: “The Parliament
has made the first cracks in the glass ceiling that continues to bar female
talent from the top jobs.”236  This is supported in much of the rhetoric
around the directive.  Although several arguments are canvassed––talent 
pool, improved governance, business case, and avoidance of group think— 
it appears that the dominant reason for the European Union directive is
social justice, particularly full economic participation of women in 
democracy.  This portrayal of gender equality as having stages of which 
economic participation is the current struggle situates the directive within 
the gender equality social justice narrative. 
C. The United Kingdom 
Lord Davies’ government-commissioned report Women on Boards
provided the most significant impetus for the gender diversity agenda in 
the United Kingdom.237  The report’s normative commitment is predicated
on the “business case” for greater representation of women on corporate 
231. The newly elected German coalition government has agreed to implement a 
30% quota on supervisory boards with draft legislation currently with various ministries
for comment. See, e.g., MacLaughlin, supra note 142. 
232. Procedure File: 2012/0299(COD), Gender Balance Among Non-Executive 
Directors of Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2012/0299(COD)&l=en (last
updated Jan. 22, 2015). 
233. European Parliament, Debate in Council 2012/0299(COD)–11/12/2014, http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1371523&t=e&l=en. 
234. European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/0081 
f4b3c7/Law-making-procedures-in-detail.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
235. Procedure File: 2012/0299(COD), Gender Balance Among Non-Executive 
Directors of Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges, supra note 232. 
236. Christina Vasilaki, MEPs Backed Quotas For Women on Boards, NEW EUR. 
(Nov. 20, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.neurope.eu/article/meps-backed-quotas-women­
boards. 
237. See LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, supra note 4, at 3. 
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boards being “clear.”238  It recommended that listed companies in the
FTSE 100 pledge their support for a target of 25% women directors by 
2015 and that smaller companies in the FTSE 350 set their own
aspirational targets to be achieved by 2013 and 2015.239  Lord Davies’ ten
recommendations include increased investor advocacy and work on the 
female corporate “pipeline.”240  While preserving the primary role for 
businesses, Lord Davies observed that government “must reserve the right
to introduce more prescriptive alternatives if the recommended business-
led approach does not achieve significant change.”241  As important as
Lord Davies’ report is for principle, the actualization of the diversity
agenda would require pragmatic operational steps.  Perhaps the most
crucial in this regard was the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct for 
executive search firms committing to include one-third of the positions on 
long lists for board appointments in favor of women.242 
It is noteworthy that even before the release of Lord Davies’ report, the 
United Kingdom Corporate Governance Code (CGC) was amended in 
2010 to include reference to diversity objectives.  Section B.2’s supporting
principle provides that “[t]he search for board candidates should be 
conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective criteria 
and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including 
gender.”243  Following Lord Davies’ recommendation of further amendments,
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) called for consultation on two of 
the recommendations.244  After consultation between May and July 2011,
the FRC announced in October 2011 that it had determined to include the 
recommendations in the CGC, albeit using a slightly revised form of 
words.245  The process leading up to this change also indicates the
priorities of the discourse.  The consultation was not merely an exercise
in receiving practical feedback; it was a de facto vote on the measures
 238. Id.
 239. Id. at 4. 
240. See id. at 18–20. 
241. David Katz, Developments Regarding Gender Diversity on Public Boards, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (NOV. 12, 2013, 9:23 AM),
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/12/developments-regarding-gender-diversity-
on-public-boards/. 
242. See Voluntary Code of Conduct for Executive Search Firms, MWM
CONSULTING (April 2013), http://www.mwmconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
Voluntary-Code-of-Conduct-for-Search-Firms.pdf. 
243. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 12 (2012)
[hereinafter UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/
Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx.
244. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, FEEDBACK STATEMENT: GENDER DIVERSITY ON
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suggested by Lord Davies.  When the FRC report states the course of 
action it has chosen, it notes that this course is “[i]n accordance with the
views of the vast majority of respondents.”246  The FRC also records that 
some respondents indicated that diversity should be considered more 
broadly than gender because of “the benefit of having foreign nationals
on the board when a company is entering new geographical markets.”247 
This comment demonstrates that the business community considers
gender diversity through an instrumental lens.  Even when ethnic diversity
is mentioned it is as a transient resource set in service of corporate 
financial goals and not in connection with any concerns for representation.
The weight this comment is given by the FRC demonstrates a key
difference between business case arguments and social justice arguments.
Business case arguments measure the instrumental value of changes and 
suggest action on the most valuable of these potential changes.  The
government is in this context an advisor and encourager, providing
information and making arguments regarding the effect of the business 
case on the broader economy.  Social justice arguments accept the intrinsic 
value of certain persons, and in this context the government fulfills the
role of creating a uniform point in time at which all companies must take
action such that no company is unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged–– 
depending on whether the changes have positive or negative economic 
impacts.248 
Following the consultation period, two further amendments were made 
and the amended CGC was published in September 2012, including 
provision B.2.4:
A separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the
nomination committee, including the process it has used in relation to board
appointments. This section should include a description of the board’s policy on 
diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives that it has set for 
implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the objectives.249 
This section reflects the United Kingdom’s focus on voluntary initiatives 
rather than compulsory requirements.  It also reflects the belief in merit as
 246. Id.
 247. Id. at 3. 
248. This is similar to the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964), on restaurants, for example. 
249. UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 243, at 13. 
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a value in itself and its acceptance of a potentially lengthy time frame for 
the increase in the number of women on boards.250 
It should come as no surprise that the United Kingdom has been 
opposed to the introduction of quotas at the European Union level.  Its 
response to the European Union consultation on gender diversity argued
that only business-initiated diversity measures are likely to be sustainable 
because “[t]o bring about real change in this area that is sustainable and
long-term, companies need to understand and believe that diverse boards 
are better boards,” which would create “a business environment where
women can take their seat on merit and without the spectre of tokenism.”251 
This argument also presumes a dichotomy of merit and quotas––premised
on the assumption that current appointment practices are adequately
merit-based. In arguing that businesses should be given the opportunity
to initiate action, the United Kingdom submission cited empirical research
that diverse boards are more effective, that “women make around 70% of 
consumer purchasing decisions,” and that there is a need for “fresh or
different perspectives” in order to prevent “group-think.”252 These arguments,
although cited separately, come together to form a business case for
gender diversity on boards.253  This business case appears to be the
primary motivator for the United Kingdom government in their support 
of increased gender diversity on boards.  As such, the government’s
submission explicitly outlines that the “overt emphasis placed on the 
economic importance of diverse boards” has drawn media attention and 
led to negative publicity for companies that are not making efforts to 
ensure more women are appointed to their boards.254 
Opposition to European Union board quotas is deep rooted in the United
Kingdom.  For instance, the House of Lords Internal Market, Infrastructure, 
and Employment subcommittee issued a report on July 9, 2012 opposing 
the introduction of a quota on subsidiarity grounds, following evidence 
from interested parties including businesses.255  The argument is that 
member states were best able to deal with the issue of gender diversity on 
250. See id. at 12.
 251.  Gov’t Equals. Office, supra note 193. 
252.  Id. 
 253.  LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, supra note 4, at 3. 
 254.  Gov’t Equals. Office, supra note 193. 
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boards without European Union intervention.256  However, the report
conceded that “[t]he figures strongly indicate that opportunities for 
progression are not shared equitably between men and women, and it is
absolutely vital that this issue is addressed.”257 In parliamentary debate
on the report and the content of the reasoned opinion to be submitted to 
the European Union, Baroness O’Cathain, the subcommittee’s chairperson, 
stated that the aim of increasing the number of women on boards was to 
“ensure that all of the talent in our jobs market is used to the full, 
regardless of gender, without the need for imposed quotas.”258  Opposition
to quotas was widespread. Baroness Bottomley argued that a quota would 
be anathema to British culture:  
A quota is alien to the British way of thinking.  We believe in voluntary
principles, in persuasion, in best practice and a bit of naming and shaming. Our
approach is a voluntary one wherever possible and quotas offend.  A target, a
goal, an objective, but not a quota.259 
Interestingly, Baroness O’Cathain acknowledged that the subcommittee 
“cannot find evidence that there is a direct link between putting more 
women on boards as non-executive directors and better financial performance 
by the company itself.”260 In the same week, on January 7, 2013, the
House of Commons also debated a submission on the European Union 
proposed directive.261  There, Matthew Hancock, the then Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Skills, claimed, “Crucially, we are following 
a voluntary business-led approach, because the research shows that 
diverse boards are better boards,”262 evidencing lack of clarity about the
real reason for supporting board diversity.
Against this climate of hostility to quotas and freedom for businesses to 
set aspirational goals, the United Kingdom has witnessed dramatic
positive change. Whereas only 9.4% of directors in the FTSE 100 were 
256. See EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, WOMEN ON BOARDS, REPORT, 2012–13, 
H.L. 58, at 14 (U.K.), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/
58/58.pdf.
257. Id. at 11. 
258. Lords Debate Women on Boards Report, PARLIAMENT (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu—internal-
market-sub-committee-b/news/gender-balance-debate.
259. 742 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) (2013) 344 (U.K.). 
260. Id. at 343. 
261. 556 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2013) (U.K.). 
262. Id. at 54. 
 37






















    
   
 









women in 2004, the corresponding figure for 2010 was 12.5%.263 
Following the heightened attention to the issue after Lord Davies’ report 
and the FRC amendments, the percentage of female directors rose from
12.5% in 2010 to 20.7% in 2014.264 That is more than double the
improvement in less than half the time.  There are now no all-male FTSE
100 boards after Glencore PLC appointed Patrice Merrin as a director in 
June 2014.265  Given the comments cited above about the British 
preference for voluntary measures, it may be that British businesses are 
more responsive to suggestion than to sanction, especially in the shadow 
of a legislative quota from the European Union.
Since October 1, 2013, United Kingdom companies have been 
subjected to new requirements to submit annual strategic reports and 
directors’ reports.266  Section 414A of the Companies Act requires all
companies that are not subject to the exemption for small companies to
prepare a strategic report.267  The FRC has provided guidance on preparing
the strategic report.268  It expects the report to “provide shareholders . . . 
with information that will enable them to assess how the directors have
performed their duty to promote the success of the company.”269 
Importantly, the new provision requires disclosure of “(i) the number of 
persons of each sex who were directors of the company; (ii) the number
of persons of each sex who were senior managers of the company . . . and 
(iii) the number of persons of each sex who were employees of the 
company.”270 A “senior manager” is defined as an employee of the
company who “has responsibility for planning, directing or controlling the 
activities of the company, or a strategically significant part of the
company.”271  It is an offense for directors to fail “to take all reasonable
steps for securing compliance.”272  If found guilty, a director must pay a
 263. LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, supra note 4, at 11. 
264. The Female FTSE Board Report 2014, CRANFIELD U. SCH. MGMT. (Mar. 26, 
2014), http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/p21687/Knowledge-Interchange/Management­
Themes/Leadership/Leadership-News/The-Female-FTSE-Board-Report-2014. 
265. Sean Farrell, Glencore, Last All-Male FTSE 100 Board, Appoints Patrice 
Merrin as Director, GUARDIAN (June 26, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.theguardian.
com/business/2014/jun/26/glencore-male-board-patrice-merrin-woman. 
266. See Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations, 
2013, S.I. 2013/1970 (U.K.). 
267. Id. § 414A, ¶ 1.
268. See  FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON THE STRATEGIC REPORT (2014),
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/Guidance-on-
the-Strategic-Report.pdf.
269. Id. at 14. 
270. Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations, 
2013, S.I. 2013/1970, § 414C, ¶ 7 (U.K.). 
271. Id. at § 414C, ¶ 9. 
272. Id. at § 414A, ¶ 5(b). 
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fine.273  Section 463 also imposes liability on directors to compensate the
company if any loss results because of any untrue or misleading statement
in the strategic report, the director’s remuneration report, or the director’s 
report.274 
The United Kingdom’s record may be affected by Scottish developments
because the government there has stated that “this issue is not just about 
fairness or giving women opportunities. . . .  [G]reater diversity on boards 
leads to better governance. If a board better reflects the people it serves, 
it will be better equipped to make decisions affecting them, and so 
improve its performance.”275  Significantly, Scottish ministers have asked 
the United Kingdom government to transfer legislative power so that 
mandatory quotas may be introduced in Scotland.276 
D. Australia 
Recent figures show that 19.3% of directors of ASX 200 firms are 
female.277  The proportion declines further in the ASX 500 and smaller
listed firms.278  Although there appears to be limited appetite for
intervention on the part of the government, there is growing media 
attention to diversity and several high profile figures have expressed
support for government action by way of board gender quotas. Federal 
Sex Discrimination Commissioner Liz Broderick, former Governor-
General Quentin Bryce, and Treasurer Joe Hockey have all spoken in
support of quotas.279  In an article for the Australian Financial Review, 
Liz Broderick argued that “[g]etting more women onto boards . . . is not 
just about gender equity.  It’s also about our desire to remain
internationally competitive.  No country, industry or organisation can
 273. Id. at § 414A, ¶ 6(a). 
274. Id. at § 463, consequential amend. 17. 
275. Women on Board: Quality Through Diversity, Scottish Government Consultation 
on the Introduction of Gender Quotas on Public Boards, SCOT. GOV’T, http://www.
scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2014/04/1438/296931 (last updated May 2, 2014). 
276. See id.
 277. See Statistics, supra note 25. 
278. For example in 2012, women held 12.3% of ASX 200 directorships and 9.2% 
of ASX 500 directorships. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE AGENCY,
AUSTL. GOV’T, AUSTRALIAN CENSUS OF WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP (2012), https://www.wgea. 
gov.au/sites/default/files/2012_CENSUS%20REPORT.pdf. 
279. Christine Milne, Why I Changed My Mind About Quotas for Women on Boards,
MAMAMIA (Apr. 11, 2013, 7:10 AM), http://www.mamamia.com.au/news/christine­
milne-quotas-for-women-on-boards/. 
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afford to waste the skills of more than half its population.”280  Broderick’s
focus on the national talent pool reflects that of the Norwegian government. 
Speaking on the ABC program Q & A, Joe Hockey, then Shadow Treasurer 
with responsibility for corporate governance issues, commented, “I just 
don’t understand how you can claim as a director of a company that all
wisdom and knowledge lies in the hands of men only.”281  He went on to
claim that “[q]uotas must be a last resort but the current situation is
unacceptable.”282  However, Tony Abbott, then leader of the opposition
and current Prime Minister, has “been cool on quotas.  If women are given 
the chance to show their abilities they will get places on their merits.”283 
In March 2013, leader of the Australian Greens Party, Senator Christine 
Milne, moved that the Senate “calls on the Government to legislate to
ensure ASX 200 companies have a minimum of 40 per cent female board
directors within the next 5 years.”284  Only the nine members of the 
Australian Greens Party voted in favor of the motion, and only one senator 
sought to make a statement on their vote.285  Senator Michaelia Cash, of 
the Liberal National Party, made a short statement defending her party’s
opposition to the motion, arguing that quotas undermine merit: 
[H]igh-level appointments of women should recognise merit and excellence 
rather than be based on some unilateral quota which could be intended or
interpreted to placate women rather than promote excellence and advance the
cause of Australian women. . . .  [T]he appointment of women . . . for reasons 
other than merit and excellence could be counterproductive and work against the 
long-term interests of women.286 
Amidst these political debates, the gender diversity movement is 
gaining traction at the business level. For instance, the Australian Institute 
of Company Directors has instituted a mentorship program for women
that links potential female board members with experienced––male or
 280. Elizabeth Broderick, Mandatory Quotas May Be Needed on Boards, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., Apr. 8, 2010, at 63, 2010 WLNR 26783427. 
281. Lenore Taylor & Kirsty Needham, Abbott Breaks with Hockey over Board 
Quotas for Women, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/
national/abbott-breaks-with-hockey-over-board-quotas-for-women-20110308-1bmoi.html
#ixzz35QXuso2K. 
& Leader of the Australian Greens) (Austl.).
 282. Id.
 283. Id.
284. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 13 Mar. 2013, 1616 (Christine Milne, Senator 
285. Id.
286. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 13 Mar. 2013, 1616 (Michaelia Cash, 
Senator) (Austl.). 
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female––directors and focuses on both mentoring and securing a board 
role for the mentee.287 
The most significant instrument in the legal arsenal is the ASX comply 
or explain regime on gender targets through its CGC.  These gender diversity 
requirements were explicitly premised upon there being a positive 
contribution to firm performance; the ASX cited the Catalyst and Reibey
studies in support.288  The ASX also states in commentary that its reasons
for recommending that listed companies have a diversity policy and report
on their diversity progress include the belief that “the promotion of gender 
diversity can broaden the pool for recruitment of high quality employees, 
enhance employee retention, foster a closer connection with and better 
understanding of customers, and improve corporate image and reputation.”289 
The diversity recommendations were originally issued in 2010 and are 
applicable to listed companies for the reporting period commencing on
January 1, 2011; they have been amended in the third edition published in 
2014.290  Recommendation 1.5 of the Code requires a listed company to
“have a diversity policy which includes requirements for the board or a 
relevant committee of the board to set measurable objectives for achieving 
gender diversity and to assess annually both the objectives and the entity’s 
progress in achieving them.”291  The company is required to disclose the 
diversity policy or a summary of the policy on its website.292  This policy 
might provide a description of the “corporate benefits of diversity” and 
the “importance of being able to attract, retain and motivate employees
from the widest possible pool of available talent.”293  In order to provide
incentives for the policy to translate from mere talk into concrete action,
the ASX Corporate Governance Council suggests that the diversity policy 
could set “key performance indicators for senior executives” that are
capable of being measured against diversity objectives.294  Importantly, it
suggests that executive compensation be “link[ed] . . . to the achievement
 287. See Chairman’s Mentoring Program, AUSTL. INST. OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Governance-and-Director­
Issues/Board-Diversity/Mentoring-Programs (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
288. See ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 152, at 11 n.17 (citing
CARTER & WAGNER, supra note 82; REIBEY INST., ASX 500—WOMEN LEADERS (2011)).
289. Id. at 11. 
290. Id. at 2. 
291. Id. at 11. 
292. Id.
 293. Id. at 13. 
294. Id.
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of those [diversity] objectives.”295  In addition, the recommendation
requires disclosure of “the measurable objectives for achieving gender 
diversity set by the board . . . in accordance with the entity’s diversity
policy and its progress towards achieving them.”296  Companies also have
to make either of the following disclosures: the gender proportions of
board positions, senior executives, and all employees, or if applicable, the
“Gender Equality Indicators” under the 2012 Workplace Gender Equality 
Act.297  In its explanatory commentary, the ASX suggests the measurable 
objectives could include benchmarks for “achieving specific numerical
targets (eg, a target percentage) for the proportion of women employed by
the organisation generally, in senior executive roles and on the board 
within a specified timeframe.”298  It also recommends that any changes to 
the measurable objectives should be disclosed by the company.299  In  
addition, the diversity policy could clearly express the company’s
commitment to diversity at all levels, include references to diversity 
across age, ethnicity, and other aspects, and provide structural protections 
against discrimination in recruitment and selection.300 
From a structural perspective, it is significant that the diversity 
recommendation forms part of Principle 1: “Lay solid foundations for 
management and oversight.”301  The recommendations gain coercive force
through ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3, which requires that companies disclose
the extent to which they have complied with the best practice 
recommendations and to explain any discrepancies.302 
In addition to the ASX requirements, the Workplace Gender Equality
Act (WGEA) requires companies to report a variety of “gender equality
indicators” including the “gender composition of governing bodies of 
relevant employers.”303  The purposes of the WGEA include an aim “to 
improve the productivity and competitiveness of Australian business 
through the advancement of gender equality in employment and in the 
workplace.”304 The risk of business case arguments such as these can be
 295. Id.
 296. Id. at 11. 
297. Id.
 298. Id.
 299. Id. at 12. 
300. Id. at 13. 
301. Id. at 8. 
302. Id. at 5.  An entity must include the following information in its annual report:
A statement disclosing the extent to which the entity has followed the recommendations 
set by the ASX Corporate Governance Council during the reporting period.  If the entity
has not followed all of the recommendations the entity must identify the recommendations 
that have not been followed and give reasons for not following them.  Id.
 303. Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth) s 3 (Austl.). 
304. Id. at s 2A(e).
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seen in recent coalition government moves to reduce reporting requirements
to apply only to companies with over 1000 employees instead of to
companies with over 100 employees for reasons of efficiency.305  However,
these suggestions faced significant criticism306 and the coalition finally
announced that there would be no change to the threshold.307 
In the three years since the adoption of the diversity recommendations,
the Australian landscape stands in contrast to the positive changes 
witnessed in the United Kingdom and many other European countries. 
Rather, the evidence suggests that there is considerable rhetoric and noise
but little in the way of actual results.  A study conducted by KPMG 
analyzing a large sample of Australian companies showed a very high rate
of compliance on diversity policies.308  For companies reporting in 2013, 
98% of the 600 companies sampled had a diversity policy or provided an
explanation for not having one.309  In the explanatory commentary, 
companies listed a number of benefits from their adoption of a diversity
policy, including “enhanced corporate performance, reputation and 
shareholder value,” “maximization of the talent potential,” and “access to
different perspectives, ideas and innovative approaches leading to better
decision making and business outcomes.”310 In the sample of 198 companies 
within the ASX 200 group, measurable objectives stipulated by
Recommendation 1.5(c) had been established by 86%.311  The corresponding 
figure for the 200 companies sampled in the ASX 201–500 group was 
56%, and for the 200 companies in the ASX 501+ sample was 29%.312 
There was considerable variability in the actual content of the measurable 
objectives with one end of the spectrum being actual numerical targets to 
increase diversity and the other end being statements, such as to 
305. See Leanne Mezrani, Women’s Coalition Fights To Keep Gender Reporting, 
LAW. WKLY. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/women-s-coalition­
fights-to-keep-gender-reporting.
306. See id.; Gender Reporting Requirements Not ‘Red Tape,’ WOMEN ON BOARDS
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.womenonboards.org.au/news/2014/media140318-coalition.htm.
307. See Minimum Standard for Gender Equality, SENATOR ERIC ABETZ (Mar. 25,
2014, 5:19 PM), https://abetz.com.au/news/minimum-standard-for-gender-equality. 
308. See KPMG, supra note 28. 
309.  Id. at 11. 
310. Id. at 16. 
311. Id. at 21. 
312. Id. at 21–22. 
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[s]upport management globally in understanding the benefits of flexible 
working arrangements that support both business needs and a family friendly
workplace; [i]mplement global sourcing, recruitment and selection principles to
further support gender diversity; [e]xplore the range of existing diversity through
an employee survey; [e]stablish a diversity scorecard; [and] [u]ndertake the
analysis required to develop appropriate targets.313 
It is clear that this category of measurable objective is an oxymoron and 
companies are finding creative ways to tick the box without really
committing to the diversity goal.  On a slightly positive note, the KPMG 
study shows that the average number of women on the board of companies 
in the ASX 200 sample increased by 3% from 15% in 2012 to 18% in 
2013.314  For companies in the ASX 201–500 group, the average remained
at 10%,315 whereas for the ASX 501+ group, it rose from 8% in 2012 to
9% in 2013.316 
BlackRock Investment Management (Australia) Limited conducted a 
study of diversity reporting and concluded that 65% of diversity disclosures
are “perfunctory” and “most organisations are applying a largely ‘minimal
standard’ mindset.”317  It also found that some of the measurable objectives
listed by companies were “not possible to measure.”318  The study found 
that the number of senior executive positions held by women had not kept
pace with the increase in their holdings of board positions and that the 
lack of a consistent definition as to what constitutes a “senior executive” 
made the ASX recommendations difficult to measure for compliance.319 
E. The United States
The SEC issued Proxy Disclosure Enhancements in 2009320 following 
a period of consultation about the need for action to address the low levels
of women’s representation on corporate boards.  The SEC noted that many
respondents believed that diversity information is important to investors 
and that it would equip them to make more “informed” decisions by
providing “information on corporate culture and governance practices.”321 
Commenters believed that “there appears to be a meaningful relationship 
313. Id. at 24. 
314. Id. at 27. 
315. Id. at 28. 
316. Id. at 29. 
317. See BLACKROCK, supra note 18, at 3. 
318.  Id. 
319. Id. at 4. 
320. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33,9089; 34,61175,
Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240, 249, 274). 
321. Id. at 68,343. 
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between diverse boards and improved corporate financial performance, 
and that diverse boards can help companies more effectively recruit talent
and retain staff.”322  The new rules were adopted as amendments to Item
407(c) of Regulation S-K, which governs disclosure obligations.323 
Crucially, the SEC chose not to define diversity because of a belief that
“companies should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they
consider appropriate” because while some “may conceptualize diversity
expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional experience,
education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that contribute 
to board heterogeneity,” other companies might have a narrower view 
focusing on “race, gender and national origin.”324 The agency also 
conceded that the rules were “not intended to steer behavior.”325 
Under the rules, companies are required to disclose “whether, and if so 
how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in 
identifying nominees for director.”326  If the company has a diversity 
policy, it has to “describe how this policy is implemented, as well as how 
the nominating committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its
policy.”327  Notably, the SEC does not mandate that companies consider 
diversity in appointments or that they have a policy, only that they disclose 
whether they do so or not.328 
It is not surprising that progress has been very slow and that the SEC’s
disclosure provision appears to be largely superfluous.  One study of
Fortune 50 companies documented that 60% of companies were not in
compliance with the SEC rules.329 
F. Spain
Spain was the second nation to legislate a quota for female board 
members.  In March 2007, the Spanish government announced that publicly
traded companies with over 250 employees would be required to have at
 322. Id.
 323. Id.
 324. Id. at 68,344. 
325. Id. at 68,355. 
326. Id. at 68,364. 
327. Id.
 328. See id.
 329. See Smallman, supra note 19, at 817. 
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least 40% female directors within eight years.330  The Gender Equality
Act, enacted on March 22, 2007, by the Spanish Congress, brought
together a variety of gender equity measures by incorporating several 
European directives including Directive 2002/73/EC and Directive 2004/ 
113/EC and introducing a board quota.331  The legislative program was
completed in December 2007 when the Strategic Plan of Equal Opportunities
2008–2011 was approved.332  When the Spanish socialist party formed a
minority government after the March 2008 election, they further consolidated
the legislation by creating a “Ministry of Equality” in 2008.333 
The Spanish board-gender-diversity debate is part of a wider conversation 
about antidiscrimination and social justice.  Notably, at the time the quota 
was introduced, only about 6% of directors were female and action was 
seen to be necessary.334  Article 1 of the Gender Equality Act explicitly
states that “[t]he purpose of this Act is to ensure equal treatment and 
opportunities for women and men . . . so as to build a more democratic, 
fair and solidary society.”335 The preamble acknowledges that 
higher female unemployment, the still scant presence of women in positions of
political, social, cultural and economic responsibility, or the problems of reconciling 
personal, working and family life stand as evidence that the attainment of full,
effective equality between women and men . . . is even today an unfinished task,
whose completion calls for further legal instruments.336 
The statute establishes a gender quota for the boards of corporations with 
more than 250 employees.337  Article 75 provides that relevant companies
“will endeavour to include a sufficient number of women on their boards 
of directors to reach a balanced presence of women and men within eight 
years of the entry into effect of this Act,”338 and “balanced presence” is
defined as between 40% and 60% of each gender.339 
330. Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality Between Women
and Men (B.O.E. 2007, 71) (Spain). 
331. Id.
 332. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., WOMEN, GOVERNMENT AND POLICY
MAKING IN OECD COUNTRIES: FOSTERING DIVERSITY FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH 103 (2014). 
333. EMANUELA LOMBARDO, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, SPANISH POLICY ON GENDER
EQUALITY: RELEVANT CURRENT LEGISLATION AND POLICIES 5 (2009).
334. CREDIT SUISSE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 25 fig.21 
(2012), https://www.credit-suisse.com/newsletter/doc/gender_diversity.pdf. 
335. Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality Between Women
and Men art. 1 (B.O.E. 2007, 71) (Spain). 
336. Id.at pmbl.
337. Id. at art. 45(2). 
338. Id. at art. 75.
 339. Id. at art. 78(2). 
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The law entered into force on March 24, 2007, and companies were 
given eight years to comply.340  It is significant that despite the legal
mandate and contrary to the United Kingdom that through soft means 
seems on track to meet its 25% target by the end of 2015,341 Spain is
unlikely to meet its 40% quota by March 2015.  In October 2012, only
12.3% of board members were female in Spain.342  A major contributor to
tardy implementation may be the lack of sanctions for noncompliance. 
Unlike Norway, in Spain compliance is incentivized by a “corporate
equality mark” available only to compliant companies.343 
In addition to the government’s quota legislation, the Spanish National 
Stock Exchange Commission issued a Good Governance Code in May
2006.344  The code outlines a series of recommendations, including 
Recommendation 15 on the gender composition of boards of directors to 
be implemented on a comply or explain basis.345  This recommendation 
became a legal obligation on March 20, 2013, and requires more detailed
annual corporate governance reports.346  The National Securities Market 
Commission then issued Circular Resolution 4/2013 on June 12, 2013, 
which provided more detail of the content and structure of these required
reports, including the number of women on the boards in the past four
years, and any effective measures to promote gender equality.347 
340.  Guijarro & Abril, supra note 98, at 98. 
341. EUROPEAN COMM’N, NATIONAL FACTSHEET: GENDER BALANCE IN BOARDS:
UNITED KINGDOM 3 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/
womenonboards-factsheet-uk_en.pdf. 
342. EUROPEAN COMM’N, NATIONAL FACTSHEET: GENDER BALANCE IN BOARDS:
SPAIN 3 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/womenonboards 
-factsheet-es_en.pdf. 
343. Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality Between Women
and Men art. 50 (B.O.E. 2007, 71) (Spain). 
344. See  EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INST., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
WORKING GROUP ON THE GOOD GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES (2006), http:// 
www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/unified_code_may2006_en.pdf. 
345. See id. at 41–64. 
346. See Order ECC/461/2013 of 20 March, Approving the Content and Structure of
the Annual Corporate Governance Report (B.O.E. 2013, 71) (Spain). 
347. See Hogan Lovells & Luis Enrique de la Villa, Women on Boards–Spain, 
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=64f4e057­
cf73-4dfb-8a94-498763033381. 
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G. Other Countries 
Belgium,348 France,349 Iceland,350 India,351 Italy,352 Malaysia,353 
Netherlands,354 Slovenia,355 Spain,356 and the United Arab Emirates357 
each have implemented some form of gender quota for corporate boards.
An even greater number of countries have implemented quotas only 
applicable to state-owned enterprises, some of which predate the Norwegian 
legislation.358 Many countries are developing alternate means of promoting 
gender diversity on corporate boards. 
348. See Loi modifiant la loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de certaines 
enterprises publiques économiques, le Code des sociétés et la loi du 19 avril 2002 relative 
à la rationalisation du fonctionnement et de la gestion de la Loterie Nationale afin de
garantir la présence des femmes dans le conseil d’administration des enterprises publiques 
autonomes, des sociétés cotées et de la Loterie Nationale [Law Modifying the Law of 
March 21, 1991 Reforming Certain Public Economic Enterprises, the Belgian Company
Code and the Act of April 19, 2002 on the Rationalization of the Function and Management of
a National Lottery to Ensure the Presence of Women on the Board of Autonomous Public 
Enterprises, Listed Companies, and the National Lottery] of June 16, 2011, MONITEUR
BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Sept. 14, 2011, 2d ed. 
349. See Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des
femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité
professionnelle [Law 2011-103 of 27 January 2011 on the Balanced Representation of Women
and Men on Boards of Directors, Supervisory Boards, and Professional Equality], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680. 
350. See Lög um hlutafélög, nr. 2, 30. janúar 1995 as amended by Lög um breytingu 
á lögum um hlutafélög og lögum um einkahlutafélög. (eignarhald, kynjahlutföll og starfandi
stjórnarformenn), nr. 13, 8. mars 2010 (Ice.).
351. See The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India). 
352. See Legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 120, in G.U. July 28, 2011, n. 174 (It.). 
353. See DELOITTE, supra note 154, at 7.
 354. See Wet van 6 juni 2011 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek
in verband met de aanpassing van regels over bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten
vennootschappen [Act of June 6, 2011 To Amend Book 2 of the Civil Code in Connection 
with the Adjustment to Rules on Management and Control in Public and Private Companies],
Stb. 2011 (Neth.). 
355. See Uredba o kriterijih za upoštevanje načela uravnoežene zastopanosti spolov
[Government Regulation No. 103/04 on Criteria for Respecting the Principle of Gender 
Balanced Representation], Uradni List RS, No. 103.04 (Slovn.). 
356. See Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality Between
Women and Men (B.O.E. 2007, 71) (Spain). 
357. See Lianne Gutcher, Women on Every UAE Board, Rules Cabinet, NATIONAL
(Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/economics/women­
on-every-uae-board-rules-cabinet. 
358. See supra note 142. 
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1. Belgium
In Belgium, a quota of 33% was introduced for publicly traded and 
state-owned enterprises effective September 14, 2011.359  The timetable 
for implementation varies according to the type of company, with state-
owned enterprises required to comply by 2012, listed companies by 2016, 
and other companies by 2018.360  If the quota is not met by 2017, all
departing directors in noncomplying companies are to be replaced by
female directors.361 If noncompliance persists, the directors of companies
that have not complied with this rule will lose their benefits.362  The effects 
of this rule have been limited so far, with the percentage of women on 
boards in Belgium increasing from 6.9% in 2009 to 9.2% in 2013.363 
2. France 
In France, the implementation of a compulsory gender quota for 
corporations was delayed by a constitutional challenge to the initially
proposed legislation in 2006.364  In January 2011, the quota passed after
the constitution was amended in 2008 to include a requirement that all 
French law promote equal access to positions of “professional and social”
responsibility.365  The quota was set at 40% with a compliance date of
 359. See Loi modifiant la loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de certaines 
enterprises publiques économiques, le Code des sociétés et la loi du 19 avril 2002 relative 
à la rationalisation du fonctionnement et de la gestion de la Loterie Nationale afin de
garantir la présence des femmes dans le conseil d’administration des enterprises publiques 
autonomes, des sociétés cotées et de la Loterie Nationale [Law Modifying the Law of 
March 21, 1991 Reforming Certain Public Economic Enterprises, the Belgian Company
Code and the Act of April 19, 2002 on the Rationalization of the Function and
Management of a National Lottery to Ensure the Presence of Women on the Board of 
Autonomous Public Enterprises, Listed Companies, and the National Lottery] of June 16, 
2011, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Sept. 14, 2011, 2d ed. 
360. See id.
 361. See id.
 362. See id.
363. Kimberly Gladman & Michelle Lamb, 2013 Women on Boards Survey, GMI 
RATINGS 1, 9 tbl.5 (2013), http://www.boarddiversity.ca/sites/default/files/GMIRatings_ 
WOB_042013.pdf.
364. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006-533DC, 
Mar. 30, 2006 (Fr.). 
365. See Loi 2008-724 du 23 julliet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve 
République [Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 To Modernize the Institutions of the Fifth 
Republic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], July 24, 2008, p. 11890. 
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2017; there is an interim compliance requirement of 20% by 2014 and an 
immediate requirement that single-sex boards appoint at least one director 
of the opposite sex.366  Sanctions for noncompliance include the voiding
of director nominations and suspension of directors’ fees.367  This policy 
has seen the percentage of female directors increase from 9% in 2009 to
18.3% in 2013.368 
3. Iceland
After requiring that state-owned and municipal boards have gender
parity in 2006, in March 2010 Iceland enacted a law requiring that public
and private limited companies with fifty employees or more ensure that
their corporate boards be comprised of a minimum of 40% of each
gender.369  Although the compliance date was set at September 2013,
compliance was reached by April 2013 with 48.9% of directors being 
female.370 
4.  India 
On December 18, 2012, as part of a series of measures designed to 
improve corporate governance, the Indian Companies Act was amended 
to require certain companies to have at least one female director within
three years of listing.371  The Act passed the Rajya Sabha on August 8, 
366. See Loi 2011–103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des 
femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à
l’égalité professionnelle [Law 2011–103 of January 27, 2011 on the Balanced 
Representation of Men and Women on Boards of Directors and Supervisory and
Professional Equality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680. 
367. See id.
368.  Gladman & Lamb, supra note 363, at 9 tbl.5. 
369. See Act on Equal Status and Equal Rights of Women and Men No.10/2008, as 
Amended by Act No. 162/2010 and No. 126/2011, art. 15 (Ice.), http://eng.velfer 
darraduneyti.is/media/acrobat-enskar_sidur/Act-on-equal-status-and-equal-rights-of-women- 
and-men_no-10-2008.pdf; Act No. 138/1994 Respecting Private Limited Companies, as 
Amended up to 1 May 2011, art. 39 (Ice.), http://eng.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/laws-and­
regulations/nr/nr/7343; Act Respecting Public Limited Companies No. 2/1995, as
Amended up to 1 may 2011, art. 63 (Ice.), http://eng.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/laws-and­
regulations/nr/nr/7336. 
370. EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN AND MEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, 2013: A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION AND RECENT PROGRESS 6 fig.1
(2013) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN AND MEN IN LEADERSHIP], http:// 
ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_balance_decision_making/131011_women
_men_leadership_en.pdf.
371. See The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India);
DELOITTE, supra note 154, at 6.
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2013, and was given presidential assent on August 29, 2013.372  However, 
there are uncertainties about the class of companies to which the 
requirement applies.373 
5. Italy
Italy’s quota of 40% is due to be realized by 2015, having been passed 
in July 2011.374  Noncompliant companies face a staged regime of 
sanctions,375 including fines of up to €1 million and nullification of board
elections.376  Female representation was 3.6% in 2009 and rose to 8.2% in
2013.377 
6. Malaysia 
By 2016, all public and limited liability companies with more than 250 
employees in Malaysia must have 30% female directors and senior
managers.378  This policy was announced in June 2011 as an expansion of
the 2004 policy to increase female representation in government agencies.379 
7. The Netherlands 
Quotas in the Netherlands apply to nominations for board appointments 
as well as board composition.380  Since January 1, 2013, publicly traded
 372. See Companies Bill Passed, HINDU (Aug. 8, 2013, 10:18 PM), http://www.
thehindu.com/business/Industry/companies-bill-passed/article5003777.ece; Companies Bill
Receives President’s Assent, TIMES INDIA (Aug. 31, 2013, 12:23 PM), http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Companies-Bill-receives-Presidents-assent/articleshow/ 
22181405.cms. 
373. See  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INDIA, COMPANIES ACT, 2013: KEY HIGHLIGHTS 
AND ANALYSIS 19 (2013), http://www.pwc.in/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/publications/2013/companies 
-act-2013-key-highlights-and-analysis.pdf. 
374. See Legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 120, in G.U. July 28, 2011, n. 174 (It.); DELOITTE, 
supra note 154, at 23. 
375. SYLVIA WALBY, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR GENDER
QUOTAS IN MANAGEMENT BOARDS: 2013, at 5, 10–11 (2013), http://www.europarl.europa. 
eu/RegData/etudes/workshop/join/2013/474413/IPOL-FEMM_AT%282013%29474413_EN.pdf;
EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING, supra note 11, at 18. 
376. See Legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 120, in G.U. July 28, 2011, n. 174 (It.). 
377.  Gladman & Lamb, supra note 363, at 9 tbl.5. 
378. DELOITTE, supra note 154, at 11. 
379. Id.
 380. See Wet van 6 juni 2011 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek
in verband met de aanpassing van regels over bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten
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companies with more than 250 employees must have a minimum of 30% 
female board members.381 Legislation passed in June 2011 and will 
terminate on January 1, 2016.382  Companies not able to comply with the
requirement must include in their annual report an outline of the steps
planned to ensure future compliance.383 
8. Turkey 
Companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange must have at least one 
female member in their executive committee.384  If a company does not 
comply with this principle, reasons must be “made public in its ‘report of 
compliance’ with the corporate governance principles.”385 
9. United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates is potentially the most surprising country to 
initiate gender quotas. In December 2012, Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mohammed announced via Twitter, “We have also made a decision to 
make the representation of women, in all the boards of directors of
companies and gov[ernment] entities, compulsory” and “[w]omen proved 
themselves in many workplaces & today we want them to have a strong
presence in decision-making positions in our institutions.”386  The  
announcement came shortly after the third Arab Women Leadership 
Forum, which was held November 19–20, 2012, and focused on board
leadership and diversity.387 
vennootschappen [Act of June 6, 2011 To Amend Book 2 of the Civil Code in Connection 
with the Adjustment to Rules on Management and Control in Public and Private 
Companies], Stb. 2011 (Neth.). 




 384. See Kurumsal Yönetim Ilkelerinin Belirlenmesine ve Uygalanmasina Ilișkin
Principles], Ser. IV, No. 57, T.C. RESMI GAZETE [Official Gazette of Turkey], Feb. 11 
2012 (Turk.); GORAN SELANEC & LINDA SENDEN, EUROPEAN COMM’N, POSITIVE ACTION 
MEASURES TO ENSURE FULL EQUALITY IN PRACTICE BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN,
INCLUDING ON COMPANY BOARDS 220 (rev. ed. 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender­
equality/files/gender_balance_decision_making/report_gender-balance_2012_en.pdf. 
385. SELANEC & SENDEN, supra note 384, at 220. 
386. Sheikh Mohammed, TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2012, 3:36 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
hhshkmohd/status/277738509945679872; Sheikh Mohammed, TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2012, 
3:37 AM), https://twitter.com/search?q=%22women%20proved%20themselves%20in% 
20many%20workplaces%22&src=typd. 
387. See Noon, DUBAI WOMEN ESTABLISHMENT 7 (Jan. 2013), http://www.dwe.gov.ae/ 
data2/english_third_noon.pdf. 
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H. Countries with Quotas for State-Owned Enterprises 
1. Austria 
In 2008, Austria adopted a CGC that includes a recommendation that 
companies take gender representation into account when appointing 
directors to supervisory board.388  Following this, in March 2011, a quota
was introduced for supervisory boards of companies with more than 50% 
state ownership.389  This quota requires that 35% of supervisory boards be
female by 2018, with an interim quota of 25% by 2013.390 This currently 
applies to fifty-five companies, of which forty-four are completely state­
owned.391  Although there are no formal sanctions, it has been suggested
that sanctions would be instituted if widespread compliance is not seen.392 
2. Brazil
In Brazil, Senate Bill 112 (2010) sets forth a program to increase female 
participation in companies with full or partial state ownership boards by
10% every two years until a rate of 40% is achieved by 2022.393  There
are no sanctions associated with this program and implementation is as
yet unmeasured.394
 388. See AUSTRIAN WORKING GRP. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 144;
Commission Staff Working Document: Annexes to the Impact Assessment on Costs and
Benefits of Improving Gender Balance in the Boards of Companies Listed on Stock
Exchanges Accompanying the Initiative To Improve Gender Balance in Company Boards, 
at 55, COM (2012) 614 final (Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Staff Working
Document], http://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vj4t79f5jjze#p2. 
389. Bernadette Allinger, Government Sets Female Quota for Board Representation,
EUROFOUND (May 5, 2011), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/03/articles/at1103 
011i.htm. 
390. EUROPEAN WOMEN’S LOBBY, WOMEN ON BOARDS IN EUROPE FROM A SNAIL’S 
PACE TO A GIANT LEAP? EWL REPORT ON PROGRESS, GAPS, AND GOOD PRACTICE 7 (2012),
http://www.womenlobby.org/publications/reports/article/women-on-boards-in-europe-from 
-a?lang=fr. 
391. Allinger, supra note 389. 
392. Id.
 393. Isabel Afonso, Brazil, in BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: WOMEN IN THE
BOARDROOM, supra note 98, at 34–35; Kellen Lazzaretti et. al., Gender Diversity in the
Boards of Directors of Brazilian Businesses, 28 GENDER MGMT. 94, 98 (2013), http:// 
www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/17542411311303239. 
394. Afonso, supra note 393, at 35. 
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3. Canada
The Canadian province of Quebec has taken steps to require that state-
owned enterprises have gender parity on their boards.395 An act respecting 
the governance of state-owned enterprises and amending various legislative 
provisions was passed in December 2006 and compliance was required by
December 2011.396 
4. Denmark 
The Danish Gender Equality Act––now part of the Consolidation Act 
on Gender Equality 2000397––requires any company “where the expenses 
relating to the independent institution are mainly covered by government 
funds or where the state holds a majority interest of the company” to have 
at least 40% female board members.398  Relevant boards may be required 
to leave board seats vacant if they do not appoint a female.399 
5. Finland
The Finnish government has stated its opposition to quotas on
nongovernment boards, but in 2004 it introduced a requirement that state-
owned enterprises have at least 40% female board members.400 This
requirement had a very brief transition period and compliance was 
required by June 2005.401  An additional requirement for these companies,
from which there are only limited exceptions permitted, is that at least one 
candidate of each gender be considered whenever a director’s seat is
vacant.402
 395. See Yetter, supra note 142, at 20–21. 
396. Id.
397. Consolidation Act on Gender Equality, No. 1095, (Sept. 19, 2007), http://sm.dk/ 
en/files/bekendtgorelse-af-lov-om-ligestilling-af-kvinder-og-maend_en.pdf. 
398. An Act to Consolidate the Law Relating to Gender Equality, INT’L LABOUR
ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/2051/Consolidation%20Act%20on%20Gender%
20Equality.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); accord Marianne Philip & Kromann Reumert, 
Denmark, in BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 98,
at 71. 
399. See An Act to Consolidate the Law Relating to Gender Equality, supra note 398. 
400. See EUROPEAN WOMEN’S LOBBY, supra note 390, at 8; FIN. MINISTRY OF SOC.
AFFAIRS & HEALTH, GENDER EQUALITY PUB. NO. 2005:2, THE ACT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN 
WOMEN AND MEN (2005), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/womenrights/finland.
women.05.pdf; Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 388, at  54. 
401. Legislative Board Diversity, CATALYST, http://www.catalyst.org/legislative­
board-diversity (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
402. CATALYST, INCREASING GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS: CURRENT INDEX OF
FORMAL APPROACHES 2 (rev. ed. 2012), http://www.womenandtechnology.eu/digitalcity/servlet/ 
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6. Greece
Since September 2000, any Greek company that is partly or fully owned
by the government has been subject to a one-third quota for state-
appointed board seats.403  The Gender Equality Act also provides that
noncompliant appointments, and even the decisions of noncompliant 
boards, are subject to annulment in court.404 
7. Ireland
The boards of state-owned enterprises in Ireland have been subject to a
40% quota since 1995. 405  This commitment is reiterated regularly as the
opposition party asks for details of implementation in parliament, 
especially when individual companies fall below the quota.406  The National 
Women’s Strategy 2007–2016 also reiterates the importance of this 
quota.407  Objective 14 of the strategy, “[t]o increase the number of women 
in decision-making positions in Ireland,” is supported by actions 142–147, 
which deal with identification, training, nomination and appointment of 
women to state boards, and identification and training of women for
private sector directorships.408 
PublishedFileServlet/AAABYAHO/Approaches_to_Increasing_Gender_Diversity_on_B
oards.pdf.
403. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 388, at 55. 
404. Id.
405. The European Commission reported that “[i]n 1995 the Irish Government 
introduced a requirement for a minimum of 40% of women and men appointed to all State 
boards.” Jane Pillinger, Exchange of Good Practices on Gender Equality: Women in
Economic Decision Making in Ireland 1 (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/
files/exchange_of_good_practice_no/ie_comments_paper_no_2012_en.pdf.  However, despite 
being discussed in some forums as a quota, this requirement is more accurately described
as a target.  Indeed, despite having been in place since 1995, the target has not been met 
by some state boards.  Dail Eireann (Mar. 11, 1992), http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/ 
1992/03/11/00024.asp#N97. 
406. See, e.g., 760 DÁIL. DEB. col. 354 (Mar. 27, 2012) (Ir.).
407. See GOV’T OF IR., NATIONAL WOMEN’S STRATEGY 2007–2016 (2007), http:// 
justice.ie/en/JELR/National%20Womens%20Strategy%20PDF.pdf/Files/National%20W
omens%20Strategy%20PDF.pdf. 
408. Id. at x. 
 55





















   
8. Israel 
Gender equity in Israeli government companies has been successfully
in place since 1993 when the Government Companies Law was amended 
to require “adequate representation” of both genders.409 Implementation 
was achieved by requiring that all appointments be from the underrepresented
gender until the required quota was reached.410   Any firm in which the
government holds more than half the voting rights is considered a 
government company.  In 1994, the Israel Women’s Network challenged
the appointments of three mail directors, and the appointments were 
nullified by the High Court of Justice Israel.411  Despite the success of 
quotas on government boards, the Israeli government did not support a 
2010 proposal to expand the quota to all companies.412 
9. Switzerland 
Switzerland has required that state-owned companies have at least 30% 
female directors since 2011, the result of legislation passed in 2006.413 
10. United Arab Emirates 
The requirement for United Arab Emirates companies to appoint 
women to their boards, which was announced by the Prime Minister via 
Twitter in December 2012, also applies to government boards.414 
I. Other Initiatives 
1. Austria 
In 2008, Austria adopted a CGC that includes a recommendation that 
companies take gender representation into account when appointing 
directors to supervisory boards––not the management boards––and states
that “the aspect of diversity of the supervisory board with respect to the 
representation of both genders and the age structure, and in the case of
exchange-listed companies, also with a view to the internationality of the 
409.  Maharshak & Wiesner, supra note 141, at 118. 
410. Id. 
411. See HCJ 453/94 Israel Women’s Network v. Gov’t, 48(5) [1984] (Isr.). 
412.  Maharshak & Wiesner, supra note 141, at 119. 
413. Urs Geiser, State Quota Offers Leg Up into Men’s World, SWI (Jan. 23, 2014, 
11:00 AM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/state-quota-offers-leg-up-into-men-s-world/37 
652042. 
414. See Sheikh Mohammed, TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2012, 3:36 AM), https://twitter.
com/hhshkmohd/status/277738509945679872. 
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members” shall be given reasonable attention.415  This recommendation 
initially followed the pattern of comply or explain but was changed from 
C rule—comply or explain—to an L rule—legal—in 2012.416  Nevertheless, 
by January 2013, only 13.5% of the supervisory boards of the top 200 
Austrian companies were women. 417 
2. Denmark 
Since April 2013, Denmark has required that state-owned enterprises 
with at least fifty employees, large publicly traded companies, and large 
private companies each set a target for increasing gender parity.418 This
applies to over one thousand companies and is implemented by way of a 
“comply or explain” program.419  In addition, large companies must
annually disclose their achievements in progressing towards their target
and explain any failure to meet a target.420 
3. Finland
A comply or explain regime instituted in January 2010 in Finland 
requires that all listed companies have at least one man and one woman
on the board.421  By April 2013, women accounted for 29% of listed 
company board members,422 up from 9% in 2008.423 
4. Sweden
Section 4.1 of the Swedish code of corporate governance states that the 
board should “exhibit diversity and breadth of qualifications, experience 
and background.  The company is to strive for equal gender distribution 
415. See AUSTRIAN WORKING GRP. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 144, 
at 33–34. 
416. See id.; Sandra Mueller & Bettina Knoetzl, Austria, in BREAKING THE GLASS 
CEILING: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 98, at 65. 
http://cgfinland.fi/files/2012/01/finnish-cg-code-2010.pdf; Nina Isokorpi & Johanna Ellonen,
 417. Id.
 418. See Philip & Reumert, supra note 398, at 71. 
419.  See id. at 70–71. 
420. See id. at 72.
 421. FIN. SEC. MKT. ASS’N, FINNISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 10 (2010),
Finland, in BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 98, at
74–75. 
422. EUROPEAN COMM’N, WOMEN AND MEN IN LEADERSHIP, supra note 370, at 6. 
423. See EUROPEAN WOMEN’S LOBBY, supra note 390, at 8.
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on the board.”424  Companies must report if the rule is not followed and 
provide an explanation of what action was taken.425 Quotas have been
discussed but not set.426  The latest data suggest 27% of board seats are
occupied by women,427 up from 22% in 2010 and 6% in 2002.428 
IV. A BINDING SHAREHOLDER VOTE ON DIVERSITY
Mandatory quotas, while superficially attractive because of their ability
to achieve quick results, are likely to offer an inadequate solution to the 
problem of low representation of women on corporate boards in the long 
run. This is because, beyond mandating an outcome, they do little to 
address the complex systemic reasons for the lack of gender diversity at 
board level. Even more troubling is the generation of the wrong incentives 
for companies to appoint women solely for the purpose of satisfying a
quota without adequate consideration of other reasons for choosing a
particular candidate. Inevitably, as a result of the pursuit of such
instrumental objectives, some less than ideal women candidates are likely
to be appointed. Although such appointees may not be any worse than
similarly placed men, the taint of appointment by quota might have 
negative consequences for both perception about merit in the short term
and women’s representation in the long term.  By appointing token women
candidates to satisfy quotas, companies will be able to claim advances in
achieving gender equality despite not having undertaken more costly steps 
to develop the pipeline of top corporate executives.  For all these reasons,
quotas are a costly exercise in futility.
 424. SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BD., THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE 17 (2010), http://www.corporategovernanceboard.se/media/45322/svenskkodbol 
agsstyrn_2010_eng_korrigerad20110321.pdf; see also Sara Mindus & Ebba Werkell, 
Sweden, in BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 98, at 
103 (quoting the same). 
425. DELOITTE, supra note 154, at 27. 
426. See Lars Einar Engström, To Quota Or Not To Quota, That Is The Question, ON 
MARC (Dec 9, 2014, 10:27 AM), http://onthemarc.org/blogs/22/305#.VIvJ1jGUf0Q;
Michael Nienaber, Germany To Introduce Legal Quotas for Women on Company Boards, 
REUTERS (Nov 25, 2014, 6:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/25/us­
germany-women-quota-idUSKCN0J92JI20141125; New Swedish Government Mulls Quotas 
for Women on Company Boards, EURACTIV (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.euractiv. 
com/sections/innovation-enterprise/new-swedish-government-mulls-quotas-women-company- 
boards-308834. 
427.  Mindus & Werkell, supra note 424, at 103. 
428. NORDIC INVESTOR SERVS., AP2 INDEX OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN PUBLICLY­
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We propose a model built upon the most oft-stated claim for greater 
gender diversity—that it is better for business. Crucially, we conceive of
diversity being better for business in a sense larger than short-term profit 
maximization.  Therefore, the generation of trust, credibility, and social
representativeness might be worthy goals for corporations to pursue in 
their board appointments.  As Justice Alito recognized in the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in the Hobby Lobby case,
[e]ach American jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes
corporations to be formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose
or business. While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit 
corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not 
do so.  For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety
of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further
humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.429 
Justice Alito correctly characterized the purpose of the modern corporation,
as evidenced by the conduct of business persons as being quite broad: 
So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-
control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires. 
A for-profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may exceed the 
requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits.  If for-profit 
corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why 
they may not further religious objectives as well.430 
Our model is built upon this broad conception of the firm by facilitating
the appointment of directors so as to effectively pursue its goals in 
accordance with the desire of its shareholders.  If having more women on 
the board is better for business, there is no better way to facilitate this than
by empowering those who have the most to gain––the shareholders––to
adopt measures in pursuit of this goal.  Moreover, enforcement costs are 
low and the model is built upon decentralized monitoring and alternative 
sanctions.431 Our model is premised upon agency theory and the principal-
agent problem identified by scholarly literature.432  In the classic version 
of the principal-agent problem, because management has little of the 
429. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770–71 (2014) (citations 
omitted).
430. Id. at 2771 (emphasis added). 
431. See Sandeep Gopalan, Changing Social Norms on CEO Compensation: The 
Role of Norms Entreprenuers, 39 Rutgers L.J. 1 (2007). 
432. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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ownership of the firm at stake, there is the potential for them to take self-
interested actions at the expense of the owners––the shareholders.433  In
the modern corporation with potentially millions of shareholders, the 
agency gap becomes acute because of collective action problems and 
rational apathy.  At a structural level, incentives––monetary and nonmonetary
––and monitoring can be designed to address the principal-agent gap.  To 
be sure, shareholders have the greatest incentives to ensure mechanisms
suited to the effective monitoring of management because they lose the
most if management diverts firm resources to their own ends or performs 
poorly.  Conversely, management has the most to lose by changing from
path dependency and actively seeking out women for board appointments.
Our proposal solves this problem of incongruence by mandating companies 
to offer shareholders a binding vote on (1) whether the company should
consider diversity in board appointments and adopt a diversity policy, (2) 
if so, whether the company should impose a target quota, and (3) what 
steps should be taken to achieve the objectives of the policy.  This vote 
would be held on an annual basis and companies would have an obligation 
to disclose the results publicly. 
This model adopts existing models of shareholder empowerment in 
areas deemed to represent failures of corporate governance.  Specifically, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States all have similar 
provisions on shareholder votes regarding CEO pay.434  These pieces of 
law could provide the architecture for our diversity-voting proposal, a 
brief outline of which is below. 
A.  Australia 
The Australian model of shareholder voting on CEO pay was enacted 
in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & 
Corporate Disclosure) Act of 2004, or CLERP 9, which came into effect
on July 1, 2004.435  Following dissatisfaction with the provisions, the
Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and
Executive Remuneration) Act of 2011 was passed and entered into force
in July 2011.436 The key feature of the amendment is the invention of the
two strikes rule, which requires companies to put a resolution for spilling 
the board if its remuneration report receives a vote of 25% or more at two
 433. See id. at 308–09, 351. 
434. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012). 
435. Re-modelled CLERP 9 Lifts the Bar on Corporate Governance, DELOITTE (July
13, 2005), http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/au/clerp9.pdf. 
436. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl).
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consecutive annual general meetings (AGMs).437  The first strike is when
the company’s remuneration report receives a “no” vote of 25% or greater
at an AGM.438  Then, the company has to explain in its next remuneration 
report whether it has taken note of shareholder concerns and what actions 
it has taken in response.439  If the board does not take any action, it must
explain the reasons for such inaction.440 
Section 250R of the Corporations Act is the key operative provision for 
a resolution for the adoption of the remuneration report; this must be put 
to a vote of the shareholders.441  The vote is purely advisory and not
binding on the board of directors or the company.442  Key management 
personnel or related parties of such persons are not allowed to vote on this 
resolution if details of their compensation form part of the report.443 
Section 300A provides the content of the matters to be disclosed as part 
of the remuneration report.444 This includes a “discussion of board policy”
applicable for determining the compensation of the key management 
personnel of the company.445  Specifically, the report must contain a
discussion of the link between the board policy on compensation and the
firm’s performance.446  If some compensation components are tied to the 
achievement of specific performance criteria, the report has to provide “a
detailed summary of the performance condition” together with an 
explanation for the choice of that performance criterion.447  In addition,
disclosure is required about both the justification for the methodology 
chosen for assessment and its details.448  In situations where performance
is benchmarked against external factors, those details have to be disclosed, 
including the names of any companies or indices referenced.449 Disclosure is
also mandated of components not related to performance along with an
 437. Id. s 249L(2)(a)–(b). 
438. Id. s 249L(2)(b).
439. Id. s 249L(2)(b)(i)–(ii). 
440. Id. s 300A(1)(g)(ii). 
441. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 250R(2), amended by Corporations Amendment 
Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.). 
442. Id. s 250R(3).
443. Id. s 250R(4).
444. Id. s 300A. 
445. Id. s 300A(1)(a).
446. Id. s 300A(1)(b).
447. Id. s 300A(1)(ba)(i)–(ii). 
448. Id. s 300A(1)(ba)(iii). 
449. Id. s 300A(1)(ba)(iv). 
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explanation for the absence of the pay-performance link.450  Stock options
awarded as part of the compensation mix have to be disclosed, including
the value of options exercised during the year and the value of lapsed
options.451  Other important elements include the length of employment
contracts, termination notice periods, any termination payments payable, 
and details about remuneration consultants.452  Given that the objective is
to ensure that CEO pay is closely correlated to firm performance, the
provision requires discussion of the company’s earnings and “the 
consequences of the company’s performance on shareholder wealth” in 
that financial year and in the previous four financial years.453  This  
consequence on shareholder wealth is to be discussed in relation to 
matters such as dividends paid to shareholders during that year, changes 
in share price during that year, returns of capital to investors, and “any 
other relevant matter.”454 
B. The Dodd-Frank Say on Pay 
The Dodd–Frank Act was passed in 2010 in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis and unsurprisingly contained a provision on executive 
compensation.455  The relevant provision is section 951, which added
Section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and mandated an
advisory vote on executive compensation at least once every three
years.456  Public companies are subject to the rule, and a vote on that
frequency must be held at least once every six years “to determine whether
votes on the resolutions required under paragraph (1) will occur every 1, 
2, or 3 years.”457  In addition, companies are also required to hold a vote
on golden parachute payments to executives in connection with “an
acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition 
of all or substantially all the assets of an issuer.”458  The SEC issued rules
under the statute on January 25, 2011, and the final rules came into effect 
on April 4, 2011.459  Importantly, under section 951, the shareholder vote 
450. Id. s 300A(1)(d).
451. Id. s 300A(1)(e)(ii)-(iv). 
452. Id. s 300A(1)(e)(vii). 
453. Id. s 300A(1AA).
454. Id. s 300A(1AB).
455. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
456. Id. § 951(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1899 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1)). 
457. Id. § 951(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1899 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(2)). 
458. Id. § 951(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1899 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(1)). 
459. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-
Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm. 
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may not be construed—(1) as overruling a decision by [the company] or board of
directors; (2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of [the
company] or board of directors; (3) to create or imply any additional fiduciary
duties for [the company] or board of directors; or (4) to restrict or limit the ability
of shareholders to make proposals for inclusion in proxy materials related to 
executive compensation.460 
Institutional investment managers subject to section 13(f) are required to
provide an annual report on how they voted on say on pay resolutions.461 
The early evidence on the impact of Dodd–Frank appears to be positive. 
Contrary to the calamitous projections of naysayers, most management-
sponsored resolutions have been adopted and there is no evidence that 
companies have suffered in terms of attracting good executive talent.  To 
the contrary, there is evidence of better engagement between management 
and shareholders, and it is likely that many conflicts are being averted by 
such engagement efforts. For instance, in 2014, say-on-pay resolutions 
received an average shareholder support of 93% based on a study conducted 
by the consulting firm Towers Watson.462  Scholarly work documents that
“[p]oorly performing companies with high levels of executive pay often
experienced greater shareholder dissatisfaction than other firms and made
significant changes to their pay practices after unfavorable votes.”463  The
media and activists have also employed negative votes to shame executives
seen to be greedy when their company has not performed to expectations.464 
Although the evidence of constraining CEO pay might be thin, this shaming 
function is valuable in corporate law because of its expressive dimension
and enabling of bargaining between shareholders and management. 
C. Merits of a Binding Vote on Diversity
Our model has the following advantages over the legal approaches 
adopted by other jurisdictions considered above.  First, it is consistent 
460. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 951(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)). 
461. Id. § 951(d), 124 Stat. at 1900 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(d)). 
462. Emily Chasan, Early Say-on-Pay Results Show Rising Support, Few Failures, 
WALL ST. J. (April 2, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/04/02/early-say-on­
pay-results-show-rising-support-few-failures/. 
463. Randall Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater 
Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1216
(2012).
464. See Sandeep Gopalan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 757, 758–59 (2007). 
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with the agency theory of the firm and empowers shareholders to monitor
management better to ensure that a “corporation[, which] is simply a form 
of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends,” actually
delivers performance.465  To be sure, if, as the evidence indicates, women 
are better suited for board positions because of their detail orientation and 
propensity for intensive monitoring, management has an incentive to 
either block such appointments or at a minimum not to be proactive in 
seeking female candidates.  Our proposal overcomes this principal-agent 
gap problem by allowing shareholders to determine whether the company 
should consider a diversity target. 
Second, our model is not overly paternalistic and offers companies
autonomy in designing optimal arrangements.  Under the nexus of
contracts theory of the firm, mandatory rules stipulated by the state are
inferior because they stifle the ability of the market to craft superior
solutions.  If our model is adopted, the binding vote empowers shareholders 
and facilitates better engagement with management.  As a result, there is 
likely to be bargaining between the two groups about whether the 
company would benefit from a diversity policy.  Further, shareholders and 
management could negotiate a target quota that suits its unique situation 
in light of its business, product portfolio, target consumers, employee 
profile, and stakeholder relationships.  As part of the bargaining, shareholders 
could also stipulate performance indicators for senior management such 
as a link between compensation and the achievement of the target quota. 
This would naturally vary from company to company and enable a level 
of experimentation and innovation that mandatory legislation cannot 
deliver.  In turn, the operation of such performance measures and disclosure
thereof would generate secondary effects such as the emergence of diversity 
champions and competitive positioning. 
Third, our proposal is flexible and capable of variation more quickly
than mandatory quota legislation.  For instance, a company might achieve
an optimal level of representation and decide that there is no need for a 
quota for the following year.  It can assess whether gender diversity 
continues at that level or not and then decide on steps to address each
situation. If diversity declines, it might tweak performance indicators and
rewards for senior management rather than stipulating a quota.  Or it might 
ask for development programs to generate a pipeline of senior executives
capable of elevation over time.  As is evident, there are innumerable 
permutations and combinations of available options for a company that 
cannot be specified in any legislative approach. 
465.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
64
GOPALAN FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2018 3:05 PM      
  













   
 
  






[VOL. 52:  1, 2015] Corporate Board Diversity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Fourth, the proposal reduces the possibility of stigmatizing women who 
are appointed to boards because of perceptions about lack of merit.  If
women are appointed pursuant to a legislatively mandated quota, businesses
will comply despite their objections and the women who are appointed 
will bear the cross of being diversity candidates.  They are unlikely to feel
the same sense of commitment to the board following negative attention. 
It is also likely that there will be conflict in the board because of resistance 
and antagonism by other members.  In addition, such mandated quota 
appointments are likely to reduce shareholder and other constituencies’ 
trust in the board due to a perception that board members have not been
appointed because of competence but rather to satisfy a legal requirement.
This is counterproductive to the asserted claims about diversity being
good for business because the board expends its limited time on conflict 
and not on its primary function––monitoring the actions of management. 
Fifth, the shareholder vote offers a public forum for discussion and 
debate about whether diversity appointments are suitable for the company 
reducing the potential for summary condemnation based purely upon the
number of women on the board.  If, after debate, there are bona fide 
reasons for not imposing a diversity policy, the company can escape stigma. 
Finally, our proposal places responsibility in the hands of those with the 
most to gain from diversity within the limits of corporate governance law. 
Even under the narrow view of the corporate objective as shareholder 
wealth maximization, it stands to reason that the responsibility for taking 
steps that maximize wealth should rest with shareholders.  The law’s role 
is to remove any barriers, and the binding vote eliminates the problem of 
collective action and management capture. 
V. CONCLUSION
There is a growing realization that the current low level of women’s 
representation on corporate boards is difficult to justify in a society
premised upon gender equality.  Nevertheless, in the face of continued 
resistance by business interests to regulatory solutions, policy makers
have focused upon offering business-friendly justifications for appointing
more women directors claiming that increased representation is positively
associated with firm performance. These arguments have been buttressed
by a plethora of empirical studies examining the relationship between
gender diversity and a variety of aspects of firm performance and purporting
to show a positive relationship. Conversely, there are studies showing a
negative association between diversity and firm performance highlighting 
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increased conflict and decreased perceptions of merit.  Both categories of
empirical literature have problems of reverse causality and endogeneity, 
making clear conclusions difficult to draw.  Amidst this landscape of
empirical work, some of the clearest available evidence concerns the
relationship between diversity and better monitoring of management.  We 
argue that diversity goals will not be achieved by businesses absent
regulatory action and that cheap talk is likely as long as information
asymmetries persist.  Therefore, we offer a model tailored to empowering
shareholders and designed to enable one of the key structural goals of 
corporate governance law––to reduce the principal-agent gap via the
mechanism of the board of directors.  If shareholders have a say in the
constitution of the board of directors and believe that diversity is an 
attribute worthy of pursuit, they can vote for it compelling management
to consider more women for board positions.  This solution is incentive-
compatible, flexible, and less costly than mandatory quotas. 
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